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INTRODUCTION
We could all imagine a world in which the law afforded a rem-
edy for the breach of every promise made,' whether such promises
were spoken or unspoken,' "obviously in jest.?" or just as obviously
serious.' The law of contracts, however, has adopted a different sys-
tem-one of limited enforceability-in which some, but not all,
promises are enforceable." "The first great question of contract law,
therefore, is [to decide] what kinds of promises should be enforced.?"
To differentiate enforceable from unenforceable promises and
thus "to tell us which interpersonal commitments the law ought to
enforce" various doctrinal approaches evolved: The nineteenth cen-
tury classical scheme" made resolving questions of contract enforce-
I, Such a world would not appeal to the contracts teacher, lawyer, or judge,
for it would render their jobs superfluous. Such a system would remove the main
function of a contracts scholar-that of distinguishing between enforceable and un-
enforceable promises. Tbe undifferentiated enforcement of promises would obviate
the need for precise legal delineation. Sucb obviation inevitably results from a deci-
sion that drawing distinctions is impossible or fruitless. Adaptation theorists at-
tempting "to distinguish adaptive from maladaptive law" would experience the same
destruction of their role if one called all law adaptive. Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1030 (1981). If one adopts a "Panglossian" adap-
tive theory, surmising "that whatever law exists is on that account presumptively
adaptive," the adaptation theorist would be without purpose. [d.
2. To be effective, promises must be communicated. Unspoken promises,
even if seriously intended, would not satisfy the requirement of a "manifestation of
intention to act." RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 (1981), For an anal.
ysis of the relation between the manifestation of intent standard adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the notion of "contract ... [as] something
other than a system of voluntary obligation," see Dalton, An Essay in the Decon-
struction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1039·65, 1066 (1985).
3. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM, L. REV. 929, 959
(1958).
4. Although, manifestly jesting promises would ordinarily be unenforceable,
those that were obviously serious would be enforceable. Under the objective theory
of contract, a reasonable person would believe that his assent was only "invited" by
a serious promise and not by a jesting one. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 24 (1981).
5. "To be enforceable, the promise must be accompanied by some other
factor. ... The question now to be discussed is what is this other factor. What fact
or facts must accompany a promise to make it enforceable at law?" I A. CORBIN.
CORBINON CONTRACTS§ 110, at 490 (1963) (footnote omitted), cited in Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM, L. REV. 269, 269 n.1 (1986).
6. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640,
642 (1982), cited in Barnett, supra note 5, at 269 n.l , The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts reflects that view in § 1, which defines a contract as a "promise or set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy .. , ." ld.
7. Barnett, supra note 5, at 269.
8. For a discussion of the major tenets of the classical model of contract
law, see Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829,
831·36 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Feinman, Critical Approachesi; Feinman,
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ability seem deceptively easy." One simply appli~d orthodox doctri-
nal mechanisms like the bargain theory and, III some cases, the
statute of frauds" to determine whether the parties had achieved the
restrictive conditions of contract liability." Bargain theory enforces
promises that induce detrimental reliance if the promis?r clearly. and
expressly signals his willingness to be bound on the basis of specified
detrimental reliance by the promisee and the promisee either signals
a willingness to furnish or actually furnishes, the requested conduct
in exchange for the promisor's promise." In some instances the
Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 618, 681-84 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Feinman, Judicial Method]; Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law. with Special References to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,568-70 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives]: Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728-31 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Private Law Adjudicationi.
For a discussion of the classical model's attachment to formal rules, see infra
notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
9. Realist critics contended that the simplicity of the rules masked the "in-
definitely manipulable" nature of the formation rules. Gordon, supra note 1, at
1025.
10. The statute of frauds requires certain agreements to be in writing to be
enforceable. See 2 A. CORBIN.supra note 5, § 275; E.A. FARNSWORTH,CONTRACTS
§§ 6.\-.12 (1982); 3 S. WILLISTON.WILLISTONONCONTRACTS§ 449 (3d ed. 1960).
For a discussion of "the rationale of legal formalities" like the bargain theory
and the statute of frauds, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM.L. REV.
799,799 (1941).
II. There was "a dual tendency toward narrowing the range of situations in
which contractual liability was imposed, but also toward making that liability near
absolute when imposed by limiting the scope of doctrines allowing contractual obli-
gations to be avoided." Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution
of Contract Law, \8 AM. Bus. LJ. 139, 147 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Metzger &
Phillips, Evolution]. But see discussion of an expanded concept of excuse infra notes
186-91 and accompanying text.
12. A working definition of the bargain element of contract follows. Doctri-
nally, promises require consideration to be enforceable. To furnish consideration
"[a] performance or return promise must be bargained for," that is, "sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and ... given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise." RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71 (1981).
More fundamentally, the search for a bargain or exchange element in contract
seeks evidence of the promisor's signal that he will be made "better off' by prom-
isee conduct that the promisee could elect to withhold. This view of bargain is con-
sistent with "the fundamental economic principle that if voluntary exchanges are
permitted. . . resources will gravitate toward their most valuable uses. . . making
both of them [the contracting parties] better off' from the exchange. A. KRONMAN
& R. POSNER.THE ECONOMICSOF CONTRACTLAW 1-2 (1979).
Normally, contract law requires strong evidence of the promisor's verbal com-
munications that his promise is given in exchange for, or in response to, some con-
duct of the promisee to satisfy the bargain requirement and to assure that the ex-
change is "value-maximizing." R. POSNER.ECONOMICANALYSISOF LAW 35 (2d ed.
1977). A more profound explanation for attaching binding effect to promises sup-
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promisee must show compliance with requisite formalities such as
the statute of frauds in addition to an explicit reciprocal bargain."
The doctrine of promissory estoppel" arose as a deviant ap-
proach to enforceability." Promissory estoppel enforces promises in-
ducing detrimental promisee reliance," even if that reliance is not
ported by consideration that also explains the reason for attaching binding effect to
promises inducing reliance is discussed infra notes 202-28 and accompanying text;
see also Barnett, supra note 5, at 314, discussing a framework of consent within
which both reliance and bargain theories can be accomodated in terms of alternate
mechanisms for measuring "manifesting assent." [d.
13, See supra note 10,
14, The promissory estoppel doctrine is now reflected in RESTATEMENT(SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981), which states:
Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance:
(I) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise, The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires,
(2) A charitable subscription or marriage settlement is binding under
Subsection (I) without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance.
Id,
15, The history of the adoption of § 90 is generally well known, In 1932,
during the proceedings for the drafting of the first Restatement of Contracts, Pro-
fessor Corbin challenged the one-sided classicist view of bargain based enforceabil-
ity as even then failing to consider the reality of the decided cases. He focused on
the apparently deviant cases of contract law, in which courts had found contractual
liability even without all of the elements of a traditional contract. See G. GILMORE,
THE DEATHOF CONTRACT62-66 (1974); see also Dalton, supra note 2, at 1084. To
insure that the law reflected the reality of all the cases and not just a select sub-
group, he successfully urged the adoption of § 90. Section 90 made promises induc-
ing unbargained for reliance enforceable, provided that the reliance was reasonably
foreseeable by the promisor and of a "definite and substantial character." RESTATE-
MENTOF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1932).
As originally adopted, § 90 states: "A promise which the promisor should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial charac-
ter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise," Id.
16, For a general discussion of the reliance principle, see 1A A, CORBIN,
supra note 5, §§ 193-209; EA. FARNSWORTH,supra note 10, § 2,19; J, MURRAY,
MURRAYON CONTRACTS§ 93 (1974); see also Farber & Matheson, Beyond Prom-
issory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
903 (1985); Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8; Feinman, The Meaning of
Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS, L. REV. 1373 [hereinafter cited as
Historical Perspective]; Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J, 343 (1969); Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement:
The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM, L. REV, 52 (1981); Metzger
& Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of
Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV, 472 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Metzger & Phil-
lips, Independent Theory]; Metzger & Phillips, Evolution, supra note 11.
Two authors recently have disputed the centrality of detrimental reliance to
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bargained for by the promisor." Promissory estoppel initially served
a limited role as a bargain substitute." It gradually emerged as a
greater threat to orthodox doctrines, substituting for other formal
requisites to classical contract such as assent'" and the statute of
frauds."
promissory estoppel claims, citing "the diminished role of reliance in establishing
liability." Farber & Matheson, supra at 910. This Article agrees with Professors
Farber and Matheson that the cases reflect a diminution in the kind of reliance that
is actionable under § 90. This Article concludes, however, that eourts do continue to
look for evidence of reliance, whether diminished or not. that results in a benefit to
the promisor. The explanation for courts continuing to do so is related to the assen-
sua I nature of promissory estoppel. See infra text accompanying notes 202-28.
17. Under traditional contract theory, only reliance that was sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise justified enforcing the promise. Thus, "the
bargain requirement tends to narrow the range of promissory liability [by prevent-
ing] the promisor from being bound where the promisee relies to his detriment but
this reliance was not what induced the promisor to make the promise." Metzger &
Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 478.
For example, a potential employee who relies on an employer's promise of em-
ployment by selling his home and moving to the employer's location often cannot
enforce the employer's promise under orthodox bargain theory because the em-
ployer's promise is not supported by consideration. The employee's detrimental reli-
ance was not sought explicitly by the employer. Under the orthodox bargain theory,
only that which the employer explicitly bargained for from the promisee-such as
the return promise of the employee to work or his actual performance of
work-would qualify as eonsideration. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel
such promises might nevertheless be enforceable. See cases cited infra note 59; see
also Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 682 (19th century classical view
"could not include a cause of action for promissory reliance in the absence of bar-
gain and consideration H).
18. The tendency, at least initially, was to view promissory estoppel as a
consideration substitute. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 2, at 1083; Henderson, supra
note 16, at 350.
19. Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 517 (discuss-
ing Janke Constr. Co. v, Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F, Supp. 687 (W.D, Wis. 1974)
(promissory estoppel applied despite lack of eontract acceptance),
20. See Monareo v. La Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 77 (1950), cited in
EA FARNSWORTH,supra note 10, at 437-38. For discussions of the impact of the
promissory estoppel doctrine on the application of the statute of frauds, see Knapp,
supra note 16, at 67; Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at
487-91: Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79
U. PA. L. REV. 440 (1931); Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the
Statute of Frauds, 44 FORDHAML. REV. 114 (1975).
This Article contends that in deciding promissory estoppel claims involving a
statute of fra~ds defense, courts sometimes rely on certain factors, Specifically, the
more disparities that exist between the parties' knowledge and status, or the greater
the enmeshment .between the parties, the more likely it becomes that the plaintiff
Will prevail despite the technical availability of a statute of frauds defense. Con-
versely, when the parties are on equal footing or the plaintiff has superior knowl-
edge or status, the plaintiff will be more likely to lose on a promissory estoppel
c.1almdefe~ded by a statute of frauds bar, This Article classifies results as proplain-
tiff according to the standards set forth infra note 30.
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This Article will demonstrate that these apparently divergent
In the following cases, promissory estoppel claims succeeded despite the de-
fendant's statute of frauds defense. Had the courts subscribed to a doctrinal applica-
tion of the statute of frauds, these cases would have had different results. In each
case, the parties were not at arms-length either because of a disparity in status or
knowledge or an enmeshment in broader ties. When those factors are present, the
court finds for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the defendant's attempt to interpose a
statute of frauds bar to enforcement. See Esquire Radio & Elecs., Inc. v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., Inc., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs promissory estoppel
claim overcame statute of frauds defense in context of twenty year business relation-
ship); Glasscock V. Wilson Constrs., Inc., 627 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 1980)
(promissory estoppel applied to employer's promise "to protect a plaintiff who has
relied to his detriment on an unenforceable oral employment contract"); Ralston
Purina CO. V. McCollum, 271 Ark. 840, 611 S.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1981) (parties
were enmeshed in broader ties, having had a six year relationship in which plaintiff
customarily expended money after oral agreement without written documentation);
Monarco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (promise to give son farm enforced despite
statute of frauds; family relation); Kiely V. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983)
(summary judgment for employer on ground that statute of frauds barred recovery
of lost profits on securities sale inappropriate); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29,
469 P.2d 177 (1970) (one year employment contract; statute of frauds overcome);
Meylor V. Brown, 281 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1978) (summary judgment for defendant
car dealer inappropriate when plaintiff car buyer interposed promissory estoppel to
overcome statute of frauds); Clark V. Coats & Suits Unltd., 135 Mich. App. 87, 352
N.W.2d 349 (1984) (employees' promissory estoppel claim allowed to proceed de-
spite defendant's statute of frauds defense); Lovely V. Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485,
347 N.W.2d 752 (1984) (employee reliance precludes granting summary judgment
to defendant employer hased on statute of frauds defense); Schipani V. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981) (enmeshment due to 29 year
employer /ernployee relationship renders accelerated judgment for defendant-em-
ployer inappropriate despite contention statute of frauds barred breach of contract
action); Eklund V. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (summary judgment for employer hased on statute of frauds defense
inappropriate in view of promissory estoppel claim); Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole,
95 Nev. 605, 600 P.2d 229 (1979) (promissory estoppel could overcome statute of
frauds defense); Klinke V. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255,
616 P.2d 644 (1980) (promissory estoppel claim of franchisee enmeshed in broader
ties with defendant-franchisor overcame statute of frauds defense); cf, Ohanian V.
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (oral employment contract
of 13 year employee not barred by the statute of frauds).
In the following cases, the plaintiffs claim of promissory estoppel failed to
overcome the defendant's statute of frauds defense. This Article argues that the
plaintiffs' claim failed in these cases not because of the statute of frauds or because
the court found some element of § 90 missing. Rather, the plaintiffs' promissory
estoppel claims failed because they were more sophisticated and experienced than,
or on an equal footing with, the defendant or because the transaction was suffi-
ciently complex to allow one to presume both parties had equal knowledge. See
Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 621 P.2d 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff as
joint venturer in a land development with defendant could not rely on promissory
estoppel to overcome statute of frauds); Walker v. Ireton, 221 Kan. 314, 322, 559
P.2d 340, 346 (1977) (promissory estoppel failed to overcome statute of frauds in
sale of farm between individuals having no trust relationship); Tribune Printing Co.
v. 263 Ninth Ave. Realty, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 877, 452 N.V.S.2d 590, aff'd., 57
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approaches (bargain and promissory estoppel) share unifying ele-
mental criteria that situate them all squarely within an assent-based
theory of enforceability." This Article differs from scholarship that
depicts promissory estoppel as having a different conceptual or theo-
retical basis for enforcement." This Article posits that promissory
estoppel, together with other orthodox doctrines, are merely substi-
tute doctrinal methods for showing the assent required for an en-
forceable consensual exchange."
N.Y.2d 1038,444 N.E.2d 35, 457 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1982) (promissory estoppel failed
to overcome statute of frauds in complex commercial lease context); Ginsberge v.
Fairfield-Noble, 81 A.D.2d 318, 440 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1981) (plaintiff was sophisti-
cated businessman); Cooke v. Blood Sys., lnc., 320 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1982)
(promissory estoppel not available to landlord negotiating commercial lease); Con-
solidated Petroleum Indus., Inc. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim to enforce purchase price of 100,000 shares of
stock barred by statute of frauds); First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 628 S.W.2d 488
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff-bank as presumably sophisticated party lost suit
against a father promising to indemnify bank for losses incurred by bank's handling
of son's account; promissory estoppel not available to defeat statute of frauds);
Wamser v. Bamberger, 101 Wis. 2d 637, 305 N.W.2d 158 (1981) (defendant seller
of stock not estopped from raising statute of frauds to defeat oral contract when
plaintiff was prospective buyer of all shares of defendant's company); cf. Good v.
Paine Furniture Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 24, 391 A.2d 741 (1978) (plaintiff with 20
years' experience in real estate and thoroughly familiar with legal rules could not
prevail on agreement that failed to comply with state statute similar to statute of
frauds).
The above cases demonstrate that the results of promissory estoppel claims cor-
relate with certain factual contexts. Although the courts may rationalize their re-
sults on such evidence as the failure to meet a crucial doctrinal element such as a
promise or reliance, the articulated rationale is less significant than the identified
pattern of results.
21. Professor Barnett also places reliance within assent- based obligation
when he says: "[i]n sum, bargained-for-and nonbargained-for reliance are
equivalent to the extent that the existence of either in a transaction may manifest
the intentions of one or both parties to be bound." Barnett, supra note 5, at 317.
See a/so Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 905 n.12 and accompanying text.
22. Professor Henderson conceived of promissory estoppel and bargain as
wholly distinct theories. He viewed implicit "tensions between the reliance and bar-
gain principle." Henderson, supra note J 6, at 345. He saw the doctrines as essen-
tially different. Promissory estoppel is grounded in assumpsit and seeks to protect
justifiably relying promisees. In contrast, bargain theory imposes liability to protect
exchange, "apparently an extension of the idea of quid pro quo in the action of
debt." Id. Professor Henderson was determined to maintain the separateness of the
two doctrines to legitimize the reliance principle in its own right, thereby resisting
"institutional pressures ... at work to bring the reliance principle of promissory
estoppel within that process [of bargaining]." Id. at 346-47. He felt it was impor-
tant that "promissory estoppel ... be extricated from the language and label of
consideration." ld. at 350. BUI see supra note 21 and infra note 23.
23. In constructing an underlying theory of assent-based exchange, this Arti-
cle follows other scholars by first examining a "mass of microdata, 'observables'
composed of legal doctrines, practices and decisions." Michelman, Norms and
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This unified theory of enforceability threatens to disrupt the fa-
Normativity in Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1978).
This Article suggests, however, an alternative ordering for such data based on
assent.
The assertion that promissory estoppel is essentially an assent-based doctrine
questions the premises of a substantial body of legal scholarship. Those scholars
view promissory estoppel, along with other doctrines such as good faith and uncon-
scionability, as evidence of "the reabsorption [of contract] into the mainstream of
tort." G. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 87, cited in Farber & Matheson, supra note
16, at 905 n.12; cf Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 506-
07. The purported reabsorption has altered perceptions about what the the court's
role is or ought to be in questions of contract enforceability. When contract law was
perceived as wholly distinct from tort law and "within the exclusive realm of private
ordering," the judicial role was supposedly limited to enforcement of the parties'
agreement, judged by certain abstract. objective, neutral rules. Feinman, Critical
Approaches, supra note 8, at 832, 834.
As courts, however, realized that the agreement might represent the will of
only the dominant party, Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.L. REV. 629, 632 (1943), they apparently became
increasingly willing to judge pure questions of contract liability according to exter-
nal, substantive standards of "contractual morality," Summers, Good Faith in Gen-
eral Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REV. 195, 198 (1968); see also Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory,
supra note 16, at 506-07, and less willing to decide liability on the basis of the
parties' private agreements. This willingness separates modern judges from their
classical counterparts who viewed such standards as irrelevant to their primary pur-
pose of interpreting agreements to reflect the private wills of the parties. Professor
Feinman and the legal realists would argue that to suppose that policy judgments
did not intrude into this world was a classical myth. Feinman, Critical Approaches,
supra note 8, at 834; see also Gordon, supra note 1, at 1026.
The increased willingness to judge enforceability of private agreements accord-
ing to notions of fairness and other like external standards derived from "the assault
on freedom of contract" and reflected a new "regulatory conception of free con-
tract." Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 8, at 578. The
attack produced a tension concerning the court's proper role in deciding questions of
contract liability. Accordingly, the judge acts both as interpreter jfacilitator and as
regulator jpoliceman. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1735.
"The modern law's response is both a frank acceptance of the courts' role in apply-
ing social values in some areas and a retention of the Core of contract as founded on
private agreement." Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 834 ("contract
law is perceived to be like tort law, but not to be tort law"). Bur see infra notes
266-92 and accompanying text, suggesting a way to reconcile the public and private
aspects of the law.
In the context of promissory estoppel, however, viewing the expanded liability
of promisors as essentially tort- like results reflecting the intrusion of policy judg-
ments on questions of contract liability may be a mistake. /d. This Article argues
that courts decide promissory estoppel cases on the basis of a finding of assent,
which preserves the distinction between assent-based and tort liability. Farber &
Matheson, supra note 16, at 906 n.12. This Article argues that what may be per-
ceived as judicial attempts to impose social values on the outcome may only be an
effort to consider sensitively the ways in which different individuals "assent."
Professors Farber, Matheson, and Barnett all view promissory estoppel case law
as a theory of obligation that has less in common with tort-based notions of protect-
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miliar portrait of promissory estoppel and bargain as divergent doc-
trines reflecting the internecine warfare between assent and nonas-
sent based liability rules. Because promissory estoppel measures
recovery by the harm to the promisee," some scholars have assumed
ing promisees against harm than with pure contract law conceived in terms of as-
sent. See supra note 2 J; Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 906 n.12. Specifi-
cally, this Article shares Professor Barnett's view that it is important to recognize
the broader "features of the contractual process" including a search for features
"that normally correspond to the presence of contractual intent." Barnett, supra
note 5, at 290, This Article, like Professor Barnett's article, seeks to agitate conven-
tional notions that consideration is the exclusive means to make out a "prima facie"
case of assent. Id. at 314, Moreover, this Article agrees that the proper focus of
assent theory is on manifested intent to "alienate rights" because "[w]ithout such
communication ... attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage
reliance." Id. at 302. This Article agrees with Professors Farber and Matheson that
to view reliance recovery as divorced from exchange is misguided.
This Article, however, extends beyond Barnett's or Farber & Matheson's theo-
ries in exploring why, under certain circumstances, courts reasonably infer assent to
be bound even with less unequivocal and less explicit communicative conduct than
would ordinarily be required.
To rationalize the results of contract law in terms of assent might be viewed by
Professor Kennedy and others as an attempt to explain the case law in terms of the
now discredited freedom of contract model. Professor Kennedy might argue that
making assent the basis for enforceability, only re-elevates the once "dominant ide-
ology" that "argues for freedom of contract as a coherent [and exclusive] guide to
decision making." Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 8, at
576. Professor Kennedy would regard the assent theory as useless since it, like the
freedom model, would fail to provide a workable test for enforceability. "The real
problem with freedom of contract is that neither its principles, nor its principles
supplemented by common moral understanding, nor its principles, supplemented by
historical practice, are definite enough to tell the decision maker what to do. , .. "
Id. at 580-81.
Because of these shortcomings in the freedom of contract model, and presuma-
bly in the assent model as well, Professor Kennedy looks to "distributive, efficiency
and paternalistic" motives to resolve questions of enforceability. See generally id.
This Article disagrees with the conclusion that courts need to reject the freedom
model as an unsatisfactory basis for decision making. The assent theory, if expanded
and refined as suggested here, would provide a workable mechanism for determining
enforceability because it would preserve an important domain for individual free-
dom and is preferable to models, like those Kennedy embraces, that depend on pa-
ternalism or to other models called "standards based" that are beset by "the diffi-
culties of extreme indeterminacy .... tl Barnett, supra note 5, at 277, 290.
24. The once widely held belief that damages in promissory estoppel cases
should be restricted to the reliance (or harm) measure of recovery "is inconsistent
with judicial practice in these cases." Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at
686 n.42. "[T]he typical damage remedy applied in promissory estoppel cases is no
longer restricted to the reliance interest;" expectancy is now the basic measure of
recovery. ld, at 687-88. The explanation for the availability of expectation damages
in promissory estoppel cases is consistent with interpreting promissory estoppel as
assent-based. See also Dalton, supra note 2, at 1090. Despite the general erosion of
the importance between reliance and expectation damages some distinctions should
continue to be drawn. See infra note 28.
-_....... "'" .. ~... ".~-- -- ~ ,~--_ ..." ...._-,~.- .--
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that the doctrine serves a tort law goal of compensating the promisee
for injury'" and, therefore, is a mechanism for public regulation
rather than for implementation and facilitation of private agree-
ments. On the other hand, scholars have assumed that the orthodox
theory of contract law with its self-proclaimed emphasis on ascer-
taining the parties' mutually manifested intent,.· serves the different
goal of enforcing private voluntary agreements." This Article will
demonstrate that these doctrines merely manifest fundamental crite-
ria useful in identifying the critical foundations of contract. Under
certain conditions, only explicit bargaining or formalized contracting
satisfies the elemental criteria for establishing assent. Under other
conditions, explicit bargaining or formalized contracting may not be
necessary to assure reasonably that the foundational assent criteria
are met.
This new approach to contract suggests that liability obtains
when either (1) complete contracting is possible and an explicit bar-
gain or a bargain plus formalities is reached, or (2) persuasive barri-
ers to, or explanations for the parties dispensing with, explicitly re-
ciprocal or formalized contracting exist" and a plausible benefit to
25. See, e.g., W. KEETON.D. DOBBS,R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER&
KEETONON TORTS§ I, at 5-6 (5th ed. 1984) (broadly defines a tort as "a body of
law ... directed toward the compensation of individuals for losses ... suf-
fered within the scope of their legally recognized interests ").
26. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 3 (1981); see also EA
FARNSWORTH,supra note 10, § 3.1, at 106 ("contractual liability is consensual");
Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 831-32.
27. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE LJ. 472,
475-78 (1980).
28. Among the circumstances that the Article identifies as relevant to deter-
mining if barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, explicitly reciprocal con-
tracting exist are (I) the relative status and knowledge of the parties; (2) the en-
meshment of the parties; and (3) trust and confidence relations. Professors Farber
and Matheson also discuss factor 2 in their recent article on promissory estoppel.
See generally Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 925-30. In exploring the cir-
cumstances in which barriers to, or explanations for the parties' dispensing with,
explicitly reciprocal contracting exist, this Article is written in the spirit of other
literature that has explored "implicit contracting." See. e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON.THE
ECONOMICINSTITUTIONSOF CAPITALISM1-84 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 0. WIL-
LIAMSON.ECONOMICINSTITUTtONS);Arrow, The Economics of Agency in PRINCI-
PALSANDAGENTS:THE STRUCTUREOF BUSINESS37 (J. Pratt & E. Zeckhauser eds.
1985); Baumol, Williamson's THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONSOF CAPITALISM,17
RAND. J. ECON. 279 (1986). The Article will examine (I) why such implicit con-
tracting occurs; (2) whether a liability rule, as an adjunct to the heterodox arrange-
ments that parties are likely to employ, would enhance the achievement of goals
presumed to be sought by contracting parties; and (3) what the content of such a
rule would be. A regime of relief formulated in light of an implicit contracting anal-
ysis should not necessarily be expected to replicate that which follows in the case of
explicit contracting.
If one considers implicit contracting to occur in the following manner, it may
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the promisor can be identified." Cases meeting the first criteria
should be and generally are decided under the rubric of orthodox
contract law's requirement of explicit evidence of bargain or bargain
plus formalities. Cases meeting the second criteria should be and
generally are decided under promissory estoppel doctrine.
In deciding whether persuasive barriers to, or reasons why the
parties dispensed with, complete and explicit or formalized con-
tracting, courts examine several factors. None of these factors is nee-
essarily determinative, but all are important. These factors include:
(I) the relative status and knowledge of the parties; (2) the enmesh-
ment of the parties in some broader relationship; and (3) the exis-
tence of any relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.
If one or more of these factors is present, the plaintiff is more likely
to succeed on a promissory estoppel claim." An explicitly reciprocal
indeed be appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his costs, despite the increased
availablility of expectancy to injured promisees. Tbe scope of the damages issue is
beyond the scope of this Article,
Under a model of implicit contracting, a promisor (R) and promisee (E) may
often engage in discussions regarding an undertaking that R might be willing to
take in the future, However, because of a lack of information on R's part and an
unsophistication Or ignorance about the need for such explicitly reciprocal con-
tracting on E's part, persuasive reasons for dispensing with an orthodox bargain
may exist. Under these circumstances, a court may find an undercurrent of an im-
plicit contract, the terms of which vary from those of tbe potential future promise R
would be willing to make, Instead, the terms of the implicit bargain flowing from R
to E might be as follows: "E, in exchange for your taking initial steps toward mak-
ing it possible for us to formalize OUf subsequent relations, which steps are in some
sense valuable to me, I promise to keep you informed of changes in my willingness
to later reach a more completely explicit bargain,"
So conceived, it becomes possible to conclude that and understand why bargain
incurs incrementally. 0, WILLIAMSON.ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,supra at 71-72;
Williamson, Transition-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.
22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Contractual Rela-
tions]. Similarly, it becomes possible to view promissory estoppel manifestations as
within assent-based obligation, but as justifiably calling for an interim measure of
recovery that stops short of damages for breach of R's potential future promise.
29. Professors Farber and Matheson have identified a benefit to the prom-
isor as a central factor in deciding liability questions under promissory estoppel.
Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 914, These authors view such a benefit as
evidence of an "economic exchange." ld. This Article recognizes the importance of
the benefit factor for a different reason, It explains why promissory estoppel is as-
sent-based, See infra notes 202-28 and accompanying text.
30, See generally Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 925-30, for a dis-
cussion of the importance of ongoing relationships in predicting outcome. In classi-
fying the results of cases that comprise the legal "microdata," see supra note 23.
This Article regards a case as decided for the plaintiff if the decision (l) denies a
motion for summary judgment or directed verdict for the defendant, or (2) finds in
favor of the plaintiff on the merits. Arguably, the results in the first instance cannot
be classified as for the plaintiff because the decision formally holds only that the
plaintiff may proceed to trial on contested factual issues, The classification, how-
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or formalized bargain is unlikely to occur in such a context, although
an exchange between the parties exists.
The three identified factors should be explicitly incorporated
into the law of promissory estoppel. Some courts have relied explic-
itly on these factors. Courts that have not recognized these factors
have, nevertheless, reached results consistent with them. Explicit re-
liance on these factors will enable a court to determine whether sig-
ever, is appropriate because courts' views of whether the plaintiffs may proceed on a
promissory estoppel theory are strongly influenced by the relative status and knowl-
edge of, enmeshment, and relations of trust between the parties.
When promissory estoppel claims aTe raised in cases not involving one of the
factors identified here, courts generally have no difficulty granting summary judg-
ment. See. e.g., R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1984); Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1979); Bender v. Design
Store, 404 A.2d 194 (D.C. 1979); Peterson v. Petersen, 355 N .W.2d 26 (Iowa
1984); Progress Enter., Inc. v. Litwin Corp., 225 Kan. 212, 589 P.2d 583 (1979);
Moore, 628 S.W.2d 488; Wamser, 101 Wis. 2d 6)7, 305 N.W.2d 158. Although
each of these cases arguably raises factual issues inherently incapable of resolution
on a summary judgment motion, each involved parties on equal footing. In each
case, the court denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to proceed to trial.
If, however, a factor identified in this Article as outcome predictive is present,
the court is less likely to decide the case on a motion for summary judgment and
will more readily allow the plaintiff raising the promissory estoppel claim to proceed
to trial. See. e.g.. Clark, 135 Mich. App. 87, 352 N.W.2d 349; Lovely, 132 Mich.
App. 485, 347 N.W.2d 752; Eklund, 351 N.W.2d 371. In the foregoing cases,
plaintiffs who detrimentally relied on an offer of employment and who subsequently
sued the defendant employer when he failed to fulfill his promise all survived a
motion for summary judgment. All of the cases involved a disparity in status. See
Vastoler v. American Can Co., 700 F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1983) (plaintiff employee
secured reversal of summary judgment for defendant employer); Anthony v. Ryder
Truck Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1979) (summary judgment for employer
inappropriate); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1977) (summary judgment
for union inappropriate when plaintiff was individual employee); Thompson v . St.
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (summary judgment for
employer inappropriate); see also IA A. CORBtN, supra note 5, § 200 at 216-17.
Corbin agrees with the variability in case results, saying, "[tjhe relative economic
needs and capacities of the parties ... should be taken into consideration, particu-
larly in determining the form of remedy and the extent of recovery." [d. But see
Metzger & Phillips, Evolution, supra note 11, at 194 ("no necessary relationship
between inequality of bargaining power and the invocation of the doctrine"); see
also Feinman, supra note 16, at 1383-84.
The approach suggested here cannot rationalize all of the cases. Some case
results do not reflect the "patterning" Michelman, supra note 23, at 1035, outlined
here. This Article would reject these results on policy grounds. See infra text ac-
companying notes 231-37. Professor Gordon would characterize this effort to iden-
tify a hidden agenda for decision making as an "apologetic," reformist "intellectual
exercise," Gordon, supra note I. at 1019. It is reformist because it advances a new
theory that can revise the basic explanatory structure to accommodate a body of
otherwise irreconcilable decisions. It is "apologetic" because it assumes that "ex-
isting practices are rational and good, or may readily be made so by procedures and
options currently available to policyrnakers." [d.
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nificant barriers to explicitly reciprocal or formalized contracting ex-
ist and thus determine whether it is appropriate to insist on orthodox
contract formalities.
The other component of the theory-the identification of a
plausible benefit to the promisor-helps to explain why promissory
estoppel remains an assent-based theory despite the common percep-
tion of promissory estoppel as a tort-like doctrine." This Article dis-
cusses the relationship between the benefit to the promisor, the bene-
fit-bestowing action taken by the promisee, and the presence of an
exchange and assent."
Section one of this Article describes how legal scholars have
identified the doctrine of promissory estoppel as an evolving tool to
socially regulate the contracting process." Section two explores the
impact of status, knowledge disparities, and confidence and trust re-
lations on the outcome of cases. Section three documents the impact
of the factors discussed in section two on the application of a key
doctrinal element of promissory estoppel - the promise. Section
four discusses causes of the failure to achieve explicitly reciprocal or
formalized contracting. It documents the implications of imposing a
liability rule in such circumstances for modern contract theory, when
considered in conjunction with a plausible benefit to the promisor.
Section five proposes a test for deciding promissory estoppel cases
and identifies the benefits of the test. Section six answers potential
criticisms of the proposed approach. Finally, section seven applies
the proposed approach to decided cases that have taken insufficient
account of the factors identified here.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: THE RISE OF THE
DOCTRINE AS A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Some contract theorists have perpetuated a vision of bargain
theories or bargain plus formalities and promissory estoppel as con-
tradictory approaches to enforceability by depicting each doctrinal
approach as a product of differences in values, behavioral assump-
tions, and "economic conditions."" Orthodox approaches to enforce-
31. See. e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 87; Summers, supra note 23, at
223-25; cf Henderson, supra note 16, at 363 ("over the years some limited protec-
tion of reliance losses has been recognized on the basis of the tort notion that a
dealer ought to be entitled to enjoy the fruits of a franchise or distributorship at
least for a period of time which permits him to recoup his investment").
32. See infra notes 202-28 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
34. Professor Feinman might characterize scholarship in this vein as "func-
tional." Feinman, Historical Perspective, supra note 16, at 1375.
Functional explanations may differ about whether the needs served by the
expansion of the reliance doctrine have long been present or have been
produced only under modern conditions. The former view attributes the
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ability-bargain theory or bargain plus formalities-are viewed by
many scholars as a product of "models of social reality"?" premised
on an almost mythical belief in the equal ability of all contracting
parties to achieve explicit and formalized reciprocal bargains and on
similar flawed views of social reality." Orthodox doctrinal mecha-
nisms also served important belief systems of individualism, formal-
ism, and laissez-faire." If such assumptions are true, the classicist
system is sensible, despite its assertive rejection of a concern with the
"scope of social duty"?" and harsh refusal to excuse those failing to
comply with orthodox formalities.
Liberal theorists view the rise of a deviant agenda for enforce-
ability-promissory estoppel-as a positive "adaptation." to "new
models of social reality'?" and to different assumptions about human
behavior, including the ability of legal rules to affect behavior and of
the differential ability of parties to achieve explicitly reciprocal or
formalized bargaining. The liberal theorists characterize promissory
estoppel as a progressive doctrine that has evolved to respond to cer-
tain "social needs"? and to a shift in values from individualism to
interdependence." Recognition of these differences made it problem-
lack of a developed reliance doctrine in the nineteenth century to a gap
between doctrinal change and economic change. The latter explanation
suggests that the rise of a highly advanced complex interdependent econ-
omy in this century precipitated the development of the doctrine.
Id. at 1377.
35. Gordon, supra note I, at 1027.
36. The legal realists increased awareness about the unreality of the social
model upon which classical formalism was premised. "The final defect, in some
ways at the heart of the others, was the gap between the formal ideal of doctrine
and the reality of social behavior. Contract in theory did not take into account the
complexity of social reality, including the unequal distribution of economic advan-
tage in society .. , ." Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 836; see also
Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 475-78.
37. See, e.g., L. FREIDMAN.A HISTORVOF AMERtCANLAW (1973); Metzger
& Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 475-81.
38. G. GILMORE,supra note 15, at 95.
39. Gordon, supra note I, at 1027.
40, Professor Gordon might characterize theorists in this mold as "adapta-
tion theorists." To find such theorists in the promissory estoppel area would not be
surprising because "[a]daptation theory is so pervasive in the scholarship of the past
two centuries that it would be a challenge to find work in which it was not present."
Gordon, supra note I, at 1029 n.43. Professor Gordon finds that adaptation theo-
rists remain highly vulnerable to the attack that "they do not usually feel that they
have to specify what a 'social need' is, or how the particular needs they refer to
originated and have changed over time." Id, at 1030.
41. Fuller, supra note 10, at 823 ("with an increasing interdependence
among the members of society we may expect to see reliance (unbargained-for, or
half-bargained-for) become increasingly important as a basis of liability"); Metzger
& Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 506; Metzger & Phillips, Evolu-
tion, supra note II, at 200-06.
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atic for courts to continue to restrict themselves to effectuating pri-
vate agreements, judged by orthodox contract rules." Courts recog-
nized that orthodox agreements often only represent the desires of
the stronger party." Therefore, courts began to scrutinize contrac-
tual agreements more strictly. That scrutiny was often explained in
terms of the importation of external fairness standards into what had
heretofore been regarded as a value neutral domain of private will
interpretation." In this context, courts interested in law as a regula-
tory device arguably relied on promissory estoppel for policing con-
tracting abuses, expanding the social responsibilities of contracting
parties," and policing "the disadvantageous effects of the unfettered
market. "'6 Thus rationalized, Professor Gilmore's situating of prom-
issory estoppel in the realm of tort" rather than contract and the
scholarly view of the doctrine as a tool for effecting distributive jus-
Professor Feinman would characterize tracing the expansion of reliance doc-
trine to social developments as a "functional hypothesji]s." Feinman, Historical
Perspective, supra note 16, at 1377. The functional hypothesis does not make sense
to Professor Feinman, however, because "there is no clear correspondence between a
particular image of contract law and a particular social order." Feinman, Critical
Approaches, supra note 8, at 853. This lack of correspondence is in part due to the
fact that "[blecause contract law relies on contradictory principles ... it lacks co-
herence." Id. Because the underlying principles are divergent, finding a unifying
theme that is responsive to actual "social needs" is difficult. Consequently, the legal
system, instead of merely adapting to certain social needs, "had constantly to choose
among these purposes, so that the actual social need served was that of mediating
these conflicts by dressing up doctrinal formulae in traditional language to obscure"
the value choices being made. Gordon, supra note I, at 1035. This view posits the
"indeterminacy" of the value choices being made. Gordon, Tentative Outline for
Session on Theoretical Perspective on Contract Law, 20 (Oct. 10, 1986) (delivered
at A.A. L.S. Workshop on Contracts) (available at The Wayne Law Review) [here-
inafter cited as Gordon, Tentative Outline]. The view threatens to undermine "the
models of instrumental rationality underlying both the liberal theory of law and the
enterprise of legal scholarship." Gordon, supra note I, at 1022.
42. See Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 848-49.
43. Kessler, supra note 23, at 632.
44. See E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL.STUDIESIN CONTRACTLAw 13 (3rd ed.
1984); Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 834 ("modern law's response
is .. a frank acceptance of the courts' role in applying social values .... ");
Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 507-08. Professor Unger
recognizes this altered role for the state, writing "[tjhe other notable set of attrib-
utes of post liberal society is ... the gradual approximation of state and society, of
the public and the private sphere. For one thing, the state's pretense to being a
neutral guardian of the social order is abandoned." R.M. UNGER. LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY 193-94 (1976), cited in Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra
note 16, at 503-04.
45. See supra note 38.
46. Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 849. "Currently, con-
tract law facilitates exchange by educating and disciplining parties in the norms of
commerce. . ." Id.
47. See G. GILMORE,supra note 15, at 87.
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tice and altruistic goals,'" rather than for ascertaining the presence
of assent, is understandable.w
II. THE IMPACT OF STATUS. KNOWLEDGE DISPARITIES,
ENMESHMENT, AND TRUST RELATIONS ON PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
CASE LAW
Having sketched the rise of promissory estoppel as a product of
the disillusionment with the premises of orthodoxy and of the resur-
gence of substantive social limits on the contracting process, and
without deciding whether this view is accurate, this Article proceeds
to discuss the apparent connection between a model of human behav-
ior and the doctrinal developments in the promissory estoppel arena.
Such connection is reinforced by the results in the case law. In cases
expanding the availability of a reliance-based liability rule, the
courts appear increasingly sensitive to the fallacy that all persons
have an equal ability to protect themselves through the orthodox
bargaining process.w Courts explicitly have justified an expanded
promissory estoppel doctrine in terms of a new, more complex model
48, Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication. supra note 8. at 1777,
49, Professor Feinman would characterize this synopsis of promissory estop-
pel scholarship as reflecting "mainstream liberal theory." Feinman, Critical Ap-
proaches, supra note 8, at 848, That theory begins with the premise that "the net-
work of private, unregulated transactions, . _ form[s] the basis of the economic
system." L FREIDMAN.CONTRACTLAW IN AMERICA184 (1965), cited in Feinman,
Critical Approaches. supra note 8, at 848 n.66, This theory then postulates that the
legal system should facilitate that basic economic system, The means of achieving
that goal has, however, changed "as the nature of the economy has changed," Id.
Professor Feinman faults this view because it depicts consensus that an under-
lying goal of contract law is the facilitation of economic exchange, That view ig-
nares the essentially contradictory nature of such underlying goals as "freedom of
contract" and "social control" and, therefore. cannot both be accommodated, Id. at
849, "At best, , , contract embodies a temporary compromise without coherence,"
ld,
The "mainstream historical picture," id. at 848, can be faulted on two other
grounds, "Critical functionalism" advocates, id. at 849, argue that the application
of the law is exploitative-that it adapts not to underlying social and economic
needs but instead "to meet the changing needs of the dominant class," ld. This view
differs from that of the pluralist in assuming the dominance of one class-the capi-
talists-and their ability to use law to further their economic needs at the expense
of the underclass. Id. at 848-49,
Other critics fault the historical view of the rise of reliance as misguided be-
cause it pretends to be rational "application[s] of accepted principles of fairness,"
id. at 853, when the use of contract doctrine actually "legitimates an illegitimate
status quo," id. and "denies the contradiction between individualism and collectiv-
ism," Id. at 856.
50, But see Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 505.
06 ("the expansion of promissory estoppel cannot be so directly tied to the rise of
the corporation and the disparities in bargaining power it produced as can the par-
tial dissolution of classical contract law"),
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of human behavior which recognizes that many parties will dispense
with "the precision envisioned by the classical formation/bargain
consideration model. ".,
The success of promissory estoppel as a claim to liability varies
according to: (I) inequalities in status or knowledge; (2) enmesh-
ment in broader ties; and (3) relations of trust and confidence." To-
gether these factors comprise a model of "social reality" that the
courts are using to support their decisions."
The importance of all three factors reflects a trend toward the
resurgence of status'" and the parties' circumstances" as powerful
51. Feinman. Historical Perspective. supra note 16, at 1376.
52. Professor Gordon may claim that in constructing these categories based
on the facts of the cases this Article is not sufficiently "fact-skeptical." Gordon,
supra note I, at 1035 n.65. The Article takes the facts of a case at face value,
disregarding the possibility that "the 'facts' as stated in a case ... that describes
the social situation to which the legal text is to respond are also in part artifacts of
the legal system." [d. at 1035.
Even if one assumes some artifice in depicting the facts of a case, the question
for contract theory is how a court's characterization of the facts affects the courts'
approach to promise enforcement.
53. [d. at 1027·28. This Article separates these characteristics because in
certain situations some, but not all, of the characteristics may be present. For exam-
ple. two business entities between whom no marked disparities of status or knowl-
edge exist. nevertheless may be enmeshed in an ongoing relationship.
54. This resurgence suggests that Henry Maines' famous theory that the
trend in "progressive societies" to downgrade the importance of status in favor of
contract, H. MAINE.ANCIENTLAW 163·65 (10th ed. 1884), is of diminishing accu-
racy today. As described by Maine, the ancient systems of organization "fixed a
man's social position irreversibly at his birth," id. at 295. concurrently with his
rights and obligations. To conceive of a system in which the parties themselves could
set rights and obligations by agreement was impcssible. As societies progressed,
however, "individual obligation" eventually predominated over the ancient bonds of
family. [d. at 163. Maine regarded the dominance of individual contract over status
as necessary for economic development. See id. at 295-97.
The reelevation of status described in this Article is an intuitive, albeit often
unarticulated, reaction to the defects of a system that insisted on applying strict
bargain principles even when persuasive barriers to explicitly reciprocal or formal-
ized contracting existed. But see Feinman. Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at
831. Professor Feinman questions the historical accuracy of the eighteenth century
view of obligations as status based. "In fact, in the eighteenth century the contradic-
tions in legal thought between legal obligation as deriving from status and from
contract ... were highly visible." [d. at 831 n.9.
55. Consideration of individual circumstances of the parties in legal analysis
is not new. It is rooted in the doctrine of assumpsit, which held persons with certain
status, such as innkeepers and common carriers, to an implied duty against misfea-
sance. W'NDEYER. LECTURESON LEGAL HISTORY 106 (2d cd. 1957). cited in E.
MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 44, at 15. See also, EA FARNSWORTH,supra
note 10, at § 1.6. This use of assumpsit dates back to at least the fifteenth century.
[d.
More recently, Karl Llewellyn championed the view that courts should assess
the individual circumstances of the parties in deciding cases. His approach was, in
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predictive tools in the outcome of promissory estoppel cases. In turn,
these developments reflect a current tendency to "fram [e1 the legal
issuers] in light of the nature of the parties and their place within
the sphere of commerce."" Moreover, these developments are con-
sistent with changes in contract law and with such doctrines as un-
conscionability, holder-in-due course limitations, and actionable non-
disclosure, which increasingly have taken account of particular
circumstances of the parties, including their status and sophistica-
tion, in determining liability issues."
part, a reaction to the dissatisfaction with the abstract approach taken by the classi-
cists who regarded particular facts as irrelevant to the decision making process. The
classicists feared that without an abstract method judges would seize upon facts to
impose their personal views in deciding cases. See Feinman, Judicial Method, supra
note 8, at 682,
Despite the view, shared with Llewellyn, that individual facts should be part of
legal analysis, the methodology suggested in this Article fundamentally differs from
Llewellyn's. The proposed methodology does not view the facts as containing the
"single correct legal solution," id. at 699, and thus is not empiricist in nature. In-
stead, the courts should review the facts to sensitize them to the differentiated abil-
ity of the parties to comply with orthodox contractual requirements and to aid them
in fashioning rules appropriate to the nature of the parties' behavior.
56. Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 698.
57, The doctrine of unconscionability embodied in U,C.C, § 2-302 typifies a
doctrine developed to consider the individual circumstances of the parties, Uncon-
scionability takes account of unequal knowledge and lack of real opportunity to bar-
gain. A court that finds such procedural defects will more readily entertain claims
that the contract is substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable, For a
discussion of the difference between procedural and substantive defects in the un-
conscionability area, see Leff Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U, PA, L REV. 485, 489-501 (1967), For an example of a case in
which the court relied on procedural defects as a basis for scrutinizing the substan-
tive provisions of the contract, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co" 350
F.2d 445 (D,C. Cir. 1965), in which the court stated:
[Wlhen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially unreasonable contract .. , the usual rule that the
terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair
that enforcement should be withheld,
Id. at 449-50 (footnotes omitted); see also Bank of Ind. Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield,
476 F. Supp. 104, 106, 109-11 (S.D. Miss, 1979), But cf Dalton, supra note 2, at
1024-38 (criticizing the emphasis on process defects as tending to obscure the im-
portance of public values in contract laws by "reassur[ing] that the public decisions
are being made in neutral and consensual territory," id. at 1026,),
Courts have drawn distinctions regarding the availability of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine based on the plaintiff's status. Thus, the unconscionability defense is
generally denied to merchants because of their superior knowledge. E. MURPHY &
R. SPEIDEL, supra note 44, at 663-64, Due to their relatively equal knowledge and
status, merchants are deemed capable of protecting their own interests, See W.L
May Co, v. Philco-Ford Corp" 273 Or, 701, 708, 543 P,2d 283, 287 (1975) (uncon-
scionability claim failed because "both parties, . were sophisticated business peo-
ple, This is clearly not the case of an innocent consumer who has unsuspectingly
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A. Do the Parties Have Equal Knowledge and/or Status?
The cases discussed in this subsection support the proposition
that when a disparity in status" between the plaintiff and defendant
exists, promissory estoppel operates to protect plaintiffs with the in-
signed an adhesion contract." id. at 708, 543 P.2d at 287); see also County Asphalt,
Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (S.D.N.Y.), affd
444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1970), cat. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). These cases are
cited in E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 44, at 663-64.
The importance of merchant versus consumer status, with its concomitant dis-
parities in sophistication, also is reflected in the development of the close-connected-
ness exception to the holder-in-due course rules applicable in the context of com-
mercial paper. The doctrine of close-connectedness provides that if a sufficiently
close connection between the purchaser of a negotiable instrument and the original
seller exists, the purchaser may fail to qualify as a holder-in-due course even if he
technically qualifies as such. Stripped of holder-in-due course status, the purchaser
becomes subject to the defenses the consumer could have raised against the original
seller. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,UNIFORMCOMMERCIALCODE § 14-8 (1972).
As with unconscionability, the courts generally have restricted the availability of the
close-connectedness doctrine to cases involving a disparity in status between the par-
ties, with the plaintiff being a consumer and the defendant a finance company. Id.
at 483. See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Calvert
Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. App. 1968); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101,232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1,240
N.E.2d 886 (1968). These cases are cited in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,supra § 14-8.
But see Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204
( 1982).
The judicial limitation on the holder-in-due course doctrine and its limited
availability to nonconsumers reflects the importance that courts attach to a disparity
in status. Courts also have recognized the importance of disparities in knowledge
and experience in developing the "shingle theory," applicable to sales of securities
by brokers and dealers. The shingle theory postulates that, by virtue of one's status
as a brokerjdealer with superior knowledge and expertise, one assumes certain dis-
closure obligations to one's customer. Courts have based the disclosure obligations
on the superior knowledge of the broker/dealer and the broker/dealer's holding
himself out as an expert. See L. Loss. FUNDAMENTALSOF SECURITIESREGULATION
951·58 (1983); see also Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.),
cat. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943). The Hughes court recognized the importance of
a disparity in knowledge as a basis for imposing disclosure obligations. The court
addressed whether the failure of a dealer, selling securities to its customers at prices
"substantially over those prevailing in the over-the-counter market." to disclose the
markup constituted fraudulent conduct. Id. at 435. In finding the dealer liable, the
court cited the dealer's "special duty, in view of its expert knowledge and proffered
advice, not to take advantage of its customers' ignorance of market conditions." Id.
at 437; cf Fleming & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part Il, 37 MD. L. REV. 488,
524-27 (1977), which discusses the expanding duty to disclose in contexts involving
"relations of trust and confidence." Id. at 525.
58. Professor EJlinghaus identifies "inequality in bargaining position" as an
outcome determinative factor in unconscionability cases and defines such inequality
as "a disparity of status as opposed to a disparity which is the product of a particu-
lar contingency." Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757,
767 (1969). A disparity involves parties "of a statically different order." Id.
1987) ASSENT-BASED LIABILITY 915
ferior status but not those plaintiffs with superior status.
1. Status
The results in the cases appear to reflect a determinative impact
for a disparities in status factor. This factor appears to reconcile
seemingly inconsistent case law. Thus, plaintiffs who are actual or
potential employees are particularly likely to prevail on promissory
estoppel claims based on employment promises made by employers."
Franchisees enjoy similar success in lawsuits against potential or
current franchisors." and insureds are particularly likely to prevail
59. These suits have involved promises of employment on which plaintiffs
have detrimentally relied. See Glasscock v. Wilson Constructors, Inc., 627 F.2d
1065 (10th Cir. 1980); Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983); Kiely v. St.
Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975); Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66 Hawaii 194, 658 P.2d 883 (1983);
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); Clark v. Coats & Suits
Unltd., 135 Mich. App. 87, 352 N.W.2d 349 (1984); Lovely v. Dierkes, 132 Mich.
App. 485, 347 N.W.2d 752 (1984); Grouse v, Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d
114 (Minn. 1981); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Alpark Distrib., Inc. v, Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 600 P.2d 229
(1979).
Courts regularly reach similar results in cases involving promises by employers
to pay pension or severance benefits. An early case granting the plaintiff a promis-
sory estoppel recovery in an ongoing employment context based on a promise to pay
a pension is Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). For
more recent cases, see Vastoler v. American Can Co., 700 F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1983);
Landro v. Glenndenning Motorways, lnc., 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1980); Anthony
v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 6 I I F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1979); Schmidt v, McKay, 555
F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1977); Oates v. Teamster Affiliates Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp.
481 (D.D.C. 1979); Kulins v. Malco, 121 Ill. App. 3d 520, 459 N.E.2d 1038 (1984);
Sanders v, United Distribs., lnc., 405 So. 2d 536 (La. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982); Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retire-
ment Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983); Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d
121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical. NeoClassical, and Relational Contract Low,
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 900 (1978) ("Where, as in employment, this fact [impor-
tance of relationship stronger than its participants] is coupled with a high degree of
dependency of the individual on the particular relation, we are likely to find consid-
erable protection of that dependency"); cf. Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979) (court upheld employees' right to
vested pension benefits on unilateral contract theory); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins.
Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960) (court upheld employee's right to
pension because employee's fulfillment of contract conditions precluded destruction
of benefits); Dulany Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220 Va, 502, 512, 260 S.E.2d 196, 202
(1979) (court upheld employees' right to severance pay, citing unilateral contract
doctrine). But see Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 957 (7th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 878 (1987) (plaintiff retirees' argument to estop defendant em-
ployer from terminating pensions fails when there were "clear cut disclaimer
provisions").
60. Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958); Klinke v.
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on promissory estoppel claims against insurers unless special facts
show the plaintiff insured and the defendant insurer to be equally
sophistica ted."
Two cases that illustrate the impact of a difference in status are
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Clark." and Marker v. Pre-
ferred Fire Insurance Co.·, In Clark, the insured was a Marine
Corps enlistee during the Vietnam War. After enlisting, he procured
a life insurance policy that covered him for war risk and aviation .••
Subsequently, an insurance agent persuaded Clark to drop his policy
by promising an equivalent policy. When issued, the policy excluded
coverage for war risk and aviation, in contravention of the under-
standing between the agent and the insured.
After Clark was killed in combat, the insurance company paid
the beneficiaries. The company later brought an action seeking to
recover the monies, alleging mistake and improper payment." Al-
though the jury found for the beneficiaries, the judge refused to
enter a judgment in accordance with the verdict. The beneficiaries
appealed. The appellate court reversed and ordered judgment for the
beneficiaries based on promissory estoppel: the agent's promise had
induced the insured to cancel the original policy."
In contrast, Marker illustrates that, absent marked disparities
in status, the court is less likely to grant relief on promissory estop-
pel grounds. In Marker." the plaintiffs acquired real property in-
sured by the defendant. During purchase negotiations the plaintiff
agreed to retain the seller's existing insurance policy on the property
until the policy expired. The plaintiff instructed the defendant's in-
surance agent not to renew the policy and to notify him of the pol-
Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 616 P.2d 644 (1980); Hoff-
man v. Red Owl Stores, Inc .. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
Even in the franchise context, a plaintiff may lose on a promissory estoppel
claim if the facts show that he is particularly sophisticated or knowledgeable. See.
e.g., RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter Douglas, lnc., 686 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1982);
Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616, 618 (D. Or. 1967) (plaintiff
"well acquainted with the operations of a large rubber company" denied promissory
estoppel to enforce franchise agreement for tire store). A plaintiff's promissory es-
toppel claim may also fail if contact between the parties is so minimal that enmesh-
ment is not a factor and there is, therefore, no basis for the promisee trusting the
promisor or dispensing with orthodox formalities. See Burst v. Adolph Coors Co.,
650 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1981).
61. See infratext accompanying notes 67.71.
62. 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. 211 Kan. 427, 506 P.2d 1163 (1973).
64. 456 F.2d at 934.
65. [d. at 935.
66. [d. at 937.
67. 211 Kan. 427, 506 P.2d 1163.
__ ......,__ _ "":f..~ __ • __ ....,.- ,_ ,,_-_.- "'~·4 "'. ~.., .......
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icy's expiration date.·· The agent agreed.
A tornado hit the property after the insurance policy had ex-
pired. The plaintiff sued the insurance company, alleging that the
agent's promise to notify him of the policy's expiration date caused
him to detrimentally rely by not renewing the policy.P"
In deciding that the facts did not warrant a promissory estoppel
recovery, the court found it unreasonable for the plaintiff to rely on
promised notification of the expiration when the promise was made
in response to a "rather casual request. "70 The court stressed the
plaintiffs status as an attorney and licensed insurance agent."
68. !d. at 429, 506 P.2d at 1166.
69. !d. at 431, 506 P.2d at 1168. The plaintiff also argued that the agent
promised to notify him of the impending policy expiration, citing the special obliga-
tions of brokers to their clients. The court rejected this argument and failed to find
a relationship of broker and client. Id. at 433, 506 P.2d at 1169.
70. Id. at 435, 506 P.2d at 1170.
71. Id. at 436, 506 P.2d at 1171. Cases that resemble Marker because of the
absence of disparate status between the parties also result in defeat for the plaintiff.
See Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1985) (promissory estoppel claim denied
when parties were two experienced stock traders); Reprosystem, B.Y. v. SCM
Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984) (company propos-
ing to purchase subsidiaries having sales of $40 million in complex transaction de-
nied right to claim promissory estoppel); Republic Nat'l Bank v, Sabet, 512 F.
Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 976 (1982) (promissory estoppel not available to corporate president); State v.
First Nat'l Bank of Ketchikan, 629 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1981) (bank loses action against
Alaska for purported assurances regarding the availability of a forthcoming state
loan to potential borrower); Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 60 Cal App. 3d
885, 893, 131 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (1976) (plaintiff hotel developers lost action
against lender; court cited the plaintiffs' status as "experienced businessmen"); Tull
v, Mister Donut Dev. Corp., 7 Mass. App. 626, 630, 389 N.E.2d 447, 450 (1979)
(promissory estoppel claim fails when plaintiff deemed "a reasonably informed par-
ticipant in a commercial venture"); Union Nat'l Bank in Minot V. Schimke, 210
N.W.2d 176, 181 (N.D. 1973) (bank unable to assert promissory estoppel despite
promise when defendant "did not know what the guaranty contract was nor the
reason why the Bank wanted it"); First Nat'I Bank in Clarksville V. Moore, 628
S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (lender unable to assert promissory estoppel
claim to enforce individual's promise to guarantee son's debt); Briercroft Sav. &
Loan Ass'n V. Foster Fin. Corp., 533 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ, App. 1976) (lender's
promissory estoppel ciaim fails); Silberman v. Roethe, 64 Wis. 2d 131, 146, 218
N. W.2d 723, 730-31 (1974) (where promissory estoppel not available court consid-
ers fact that all parties involved "were businessmen" and case did not involve "a
situation of an individual taken advantage of by a corporation"); Babler v. Roelli,
39 Wis. 2d 566, 569, 159 N.W.2d 694, 696 (1968) (plaintiff, having "extensive
experience as milk hauler" unable to assert promissory estoppel claim because
should have known defendant lacked authority to bind local dairy); see a/so
.Chirnart Assocs. V. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 571, 574, 489 N.E.2d 231, 232, 234, 498
N.Y.S.2d 344, 345, 347 (1986) (plaintiff a "sophisticated, counseled" businessman,
unable to assert that written contract diverged from his understanding of terms of
oral agreement when parties engaged in "arms-length" bargaining).
Although the courts may justify denying promissory estoppel recovery by
918 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:895
Together, Clark and Marker" demonstrate the impact of the
status factor on the outcome of litigation. When a clear and marked
disparity in status exists between a professional agent and a layman
insured, the plaintiff prevails on his promissory estoppel claim.
When the plaintiff is himself an agent so that he has panty of status
with the defendant, he will lose a similar claim, at least in cases
when none of the other factors are present.
2. Disparities in Knowledge of Applicable Law
Disparities in knowledge is another factor that appears to ex-
plain divergent outcomes." This factor most often correlates with
rationales other than an equality in status, knowledge, or sophistication, such as the
failure to meet a doctrinal element of promissory estoppel, the results evidence a
pattern denying promissory estoppel recovery to certain classes of plaintiffs. See
supra note 20.
[f, on the other hand, the facts reveal a disparity between the parties, a plain-
tiff is more likely to succeed. See cases cited supra notes 30, 59-60 and accompany-
ing text; see also Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 321
N.W.2d 293 (1982) (artist-plaintiff, craftsman of handmade products, prevailed
against commercial complex developer).
72. For a discussion of these cases, see Feinman, Judicial Method, supra
note 8, at 701-07. Feinman recognizes that "[tjhe different results in Clark and
Marker were determined not so much by differences in the ways the doctrine was
applied as by differences in the ways the underlying facts were perceived." [d. at
702. Thus, the factual context was a key element in the result. The problem that
Feinman perceives making the underlying facts determinative could be fraught with
difficulties. Even if courts properly could categorize the fact situation (a near im-
possihile task since fact categorization is suhject to "manipulation," id. at 704), the
court must still decide between competing values, such as paternalism toward the
insured versus "freedom of the insurer," id. at 706, that cannot be decided in an
objective, nonarbitrary manner, [d. at 711. See infra text accompanying notes 248-
50.
For further discussion of these cases, see Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at
922-24. Farber and Matheson rationalize the different results not in terms of the
parties' disparate status, but in terms of the economic benefit factor. They conclude
that only the defendant in Clark stood to benefit economically from a continuing
exchange with the plaintiff. The defendant-agent in Marker stood to gain no benefit
because of the impending termination of the broker-client relation. Thus, only the
promise in Clark which involved an economic, albeit nontraditional, exchange
should be enforced. See infra text accompanying notes 202-08.
73. Disparities in knowledge are reflected in promissory estoppel cases. See,
e.g., Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722, 731, 320 N.E.2d 919, 925 (1974),
aff'd, 368 Mass. 811, 331 N,E.2d 813 (1975) ("[a] misrepresentation of law ...
made by one possessed of superior knowledge to take advantage of the relative igno-
rance of another may be ground for judicial relief'). Such disparities are an impor-
tant factor in contract law for developing judicial rules excusing liability, as well as
rules establishing liability for nondisclosure.
The importance of unequal knowledge as a basis for imposing liability is recog-
nized in insurance case law. See R.E. KEETON, INSURANCELAW-BASIC TEXT §
2.5(a), at 53 (1971) ("Often the liability of an intermediary to an applicant is based
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the status factor-such that disparity in status is accompanied by
disparity in knowledge and vice versa-but not necessarily so. Dis-
parities in knowledge can assume several forms, including: (I) dis-
parities in knowledge regarding applicable contract formalities such
as the statute of frauds; and (2) disparities in knowledge about how
to protect one's self-interest in the transaction. Courts generally are
skeptical of promissory estoppel claims when there are no marked
disparities in the parties' knowledge of the applicable contract for-
malities and the plaintiff has failed to adhere to such formalities.
From the courts' disinclination to honor claims when the plaintiff
can discover the applicable rules, one can infer that a plaintiff is
more likely to win on a promissory estoppel claim if the court is
convinced that the plaintiff has unequal knowledge of the applicable
contract formalities.
The second type of knowledge disparity is also likely to affect
outcome. If the defendant's position renders him an expert with su-
perior ability to uncover information about the proposed transaction
that the plaintiff must know to protect his own self-interest, the
plaintiff is likely to prevail.
The importance that the relative status of the parties and the
relative capacity to know the law of contract formalities have on out-
come is apparent in cases in which the plaintiff loses in part because
of the parties' parity of both (I) status and (2) knowledge of con-
tract formalities. Jungmann v. St. Regis Paper Co." illustrates how
a convergence of equal status and legal sophistication about contract
formalities can affect outcome. In Jungmann, the plaintiffs status as
an attorney, together with his knowledge of orthodox contract for-
malities, prompted the court to reject his promissory estoppel claim.
The defendant was a potential buyer of property on which the plain-
tiff held an option. Represented by two attorneys, the plaintiff ar-
upon his superior knowledge .... "); see also Harr v. AllState Ins. Co., 54 N.J.
287, 309, 255 A.2d 208, 210 (1969) (court cited special knowledge of the insurer
and the plaintiffs lack of thorough understanding of policy terms in reversing dis-
missal of the plaintiffs action); Rider v, Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 477, 480, 201 A.2d
561, 569, 570 (1964) (court contrasted the broker's skill and judgment with the
plaintiff-insured's lack of knowledge of policy's technical aspects in denying the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss); Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,
200 N.J. Super. 333, 342, 491 A.2d 737, 740-41 (1984) (court cited the plaintiffs
lack of knowledge and sophistication as well as the insurance agent's special skill
and knowledge in deciding to reform the policy); Dodge v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 17 VI. 409, 410, 250 A.2d 742, 743 (1969) (court cited the plaintiffs
lack of "familiarity with insurance malters" in deciding that insurance company
had duty to defend its insured). If, on the other hand, the plaintiff-insured is sophis-
ticated, the court is less willing to entertain a claim. But see Cox v. Santoro, 98 N.J.
Super. 360, 366, 237 A.2d 491, 494 (1967) (insurance ccmpany not liable to plain-
tiff with "40 years experience in the insurance business").
74. 682 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1982).
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rived at a preliminary understanding with the defendant's represent-
atives, one of whom indicated to the plaintiff that they "had a
deal.'?" The defendant, having found better property, refused to con-
summate the deal. The plaintiff sued on the oral contract and won a
jury verdict." The defendant obtained judgment notwithstanding the
verdict" and promissory estoppel was not available.
The plaintiffs only argument against applying the statute of
frauds was promissory estoppel." Therefore, the court of appeals
first considered whether the plaintiff had proved the elements of
promissory estoppel and then affirmed the district court's rejection
of the plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim for lack of a "clear and
definite agreement.'?" The appellate court stressed that "[ejvidence
revealed that the parties knew the statute of frauds applied to con-
tracts for the sale of land.'?" The plaintiff was an "attorney and an
experienced real estate investor.l''" The plaintiffs experience and
knowledge of the law made the application of promissory estoppel
inappropriate.
The importance of status and knowledge of legal formalities
also is apparent in Gruen Industries, Inc. v. Billerr" In Gruen, the
plaintiffs, a parent corporation and its subsidiary, engaged in prelim-
inary negotiations with the defendants for the sale of defendants' in-
terest in another corporation." The plaintiffs advised the defendants
that they did not want to finance the drafting of a written sales
agreement without a "firm commitment" from the defendants."
Such assurances were forthcoming; however, after the plaintiffs be-
gan preparing the formal purchase agreement, the defendants sold
their shares to a higher bidder."
When the plaintiffs sued the defendants under a promissory es-
toppel claim based on the defendants' oral promise to sell the stock,
the court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of
the promissory estoppel claim." The court concluded that, under the
circumstances, the plaintiffs' reliance on any oral promises from the
75. Id. at 196.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 196·97.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 198.
8!. Id.
82. 608 E2d 274 (7th Cir. 1979).
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 282. The plaintiffs also asserted a breach of contract claim but
that claim was barred by the statute of frauds. Id. at 277-78. '
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defendants was unreasonable.s" The court found that the transaction
was sufficiently complex to necessitate a detailed and extensive writ-
ten agreement." The court noted that the plaintiffs' representatives
were "sophisticated businessmen'tw who should have known that the
complexity of a stock purchase transaction mandates a written
agreement. The court emphasized that the case did not involve "a
situation of an individual taken advantage of by a corporation or
individual with superior knowledge of legal and business
practices. " so
Gruen and Jungmann demonstrate that when the plaintiff and
the defendant do not have markedly disparate status and the defend-
87. ld. at 281.
88. ld. at 279. The court observed that the draft of the agreement, which
was never completed, was 58 pages long. [d. at 279 nA. The plaintiffs' awareness of
the complexity of the transaction can be inferred from their having had such an
extensive document prepared.
89. ld. at 281.
90. ld. (quoting Silberman v, Roethe, 64 Wis. 2d 131, 146, 218 N.W.2d
723, 730 (1974)). The importance of status in Gruen could be dismissed by arguing
that, even with disparate rather than equal status, the plaintiff could not have suc-
ceeded. The conditional nature of the defendant's promise made it inherently unrea-
sonable to rely on it. The promise was a conditional one because the "alleged agree-
ment ... was subject to numerous conditions. some of which were under the
control of third parties." [d. at 280. If the fatal flaw of the plaintiffs case was the
contingent nature of the promise, then no amount of tinkering with the parties' sta-
tus would alter the outcome, despite the court's protestations as to the importance of
status.
The true explanation for the court's refusal to sustain the claim in Gruen, how-
ever, is grounded in status. This is evidenced by comparing Gruen with Quimby, 51
Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123. In Quimby, Chrysler officials indicated to the plaintiff that
to be considered for a particular dealership, he would have to obtain all of the com-
pany's stock held by the widow of a deceased dealer. ld. at 270, 144 A.2d at 126-27.
At first, the defendant merely seemed to be making preliminary suggestions to the
plaintiff that would enhance his chances of obtaining the dealership. The Quimby
court easily could have decided that reliance on such ambiguous and conditional
assurances was inherently unreasonable, as the Gruen court had done, particularly
in view of the "successive conditions ... imposed" by the defendants as negotia-
tions progressed. ld. at 270, 144 A.2d at 129. The Quimby court found reliance by
the less knowledgeable party reasonable and justifiable even if the conditional na-
ture of the promises would have made reliance unreasonable had the parties been
dealing at arms-length. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
The ability of a disadvantaged plaintiff to prevail even in cases in which the
reliance on the underlying promise was arguably unreasonable is also apparent in
the context of the terminability at will of employment contracts. In Schipani v. Ford
Motor Co., 102 Mich. App, 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981), the court on appeal con-
sidered whether there was implied contract protection against termination at will
despite an express disclaimer reserving discretion to terminate at will. The court
found this issue to be a jury question. In other contexts, if the defendant, for exam-
ple, expressly disclaims all contract liability in the absence of a formal written
agreement, the court will refuse to find an actionable promise. See, e.g., Reprosys-
rem, 727 F.2d 257. The proposed approach explains the difference in result.
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ant did not exploit a plaintiff with inferior knowledge of the applica-
ble legal formalities, the court is likely to reject a promissory estop-
pel claim," at least when there are no other factors, such as
enmeshment, which could interfere with explicit or formalized bar-
gaining. In both Jungmann and Gruen the parties appeared to be of
equal status. All appeared to be sophisticated businessmen with ex-
pertise in the transaction at issue. Hence, no disparities in knowledge
about the transaction were apparent. Finally, no continuing relation-
ship of trust existed between the parties because they were arms-
length bargainers in a single transaction involving the sale of real
estate or stock. Because none of these factors was present, the court
simply seized upon the equality of status as a convenient way to ra-
tionalize the result. Had one of the other factors been present, the
court might not have found equal status a sufficient reason to reject
the plaintiffs claim.
3. Disparities in Access to Information About the
Transaction
Disparities in information about appropriate steps to protect
one's self-interest are often present when one party is an expert in
the transaction and the other party is a mere novice. When such
disparities exist, the plaintiff is more likely to prevail if he is the
novice. Such informational disparities will often, but not always, be
present in conjunction with a disparity in status. The impact of the
information gap factor on outcome is illustrated by Chrysler Corp. v.
Quimby.·2 The plaintiff Quimby served as a director of an automo-
bile sales company that had a dealership arrangement with the de-
fendant Chrysler.·· When the president of the automobile sales com-
pany died, the plaintiff assisted Chrysler's representatives in
identifying the company's shareholders. He also expressed to the
Chrysler representative his desire to obtain the dealership agreement
for himself'."
Although Chrysler officials privately agreed that Quimby would
not receive the dealership'" because of his inadequate experience in
automobile sales, they indicated to Quimby that he would receive the
dealership if he obtained all of the company's stock.·· They later
91. See. e.g., R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 76 (2d
Cir: (984) (court rejected promissory estoppel claim of limited partnership when the
plaintiffs Own memorandum reflected awareness of need to execute a formal writ-
ten agreement).
92. 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958).
93. [d. at 268, 144 A.2d at 126.
94. [d.
95. [d. at 269, 144 A.2d at 126.
96. /d. at 270, 144 A.2d at 126-27.
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advised Quimby of their concern about his inexperience in the busi-
ness and that, as a further condition for obtaining the dealership, he
would have to sell a majority of the company's stock to a manager
who would operate the company.v When the plaintiff finally had
purchased all of the stock at a total cost of $60,000, Chrysler refused
to enter into a dealership agreement with him. He sued for breach of
contract, alleging promissory estoppel.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding
that the plaintiff had established a promissory estoppel claim .•• The
court reasoned that Chrysler's representatives acted unfairly towards
the plaintiff in continuing to mislead and negotiate with him know-
ing that their corporation had already rejected him .••
Quimby illustrates a disparity in access to information neces-
sary to protect one's self-interest.!·· Notwithstanding the plaintiff at-
torney's expertise in the field of law, he was a novice in transactions
involving automobile dealerships. This created a disparity in knowl-
edge as well as access to necessary information. Chrysler's special
knowledge of its dealership requirements and its evaluation of the
plaintiff gave it a superior bargaining status and enabled the plain-
tiff to prevail on his promissory estoppel claim.
B. Enmeshment in Broader Ties
A second factor that favors plaintiffs raising promissory estop-
pel claims is enmeshment between the parties.l'" Enmeshment ap-
97. Id. at 271, 144 A.2d at 127-28.
98. Id. at 274, 144 A.2d at 129.
99. fd. at 277-78, 144 A.2d at 131.
100. Both parties may suffer From the disadvantages of a lack of access to
and high costs of information as well as the unForseeability of the future. The lack
of such information would present barriers to contracting with one another in a less
than fully explicit way. See O. WILLIAMSON,ECONOMICINSTITUTIONS,supra note
28, at 45-47, 56-59; see also supra notezs.
101. In suggesting that courts tailor contractual liability to the context, mak-
ing promissory estoppel more readily available in an ongoing relationship despite the
absence of a traditional bargain, this Article draws on the scholarship of Professor
Macneil. He rejected as entirely too myopic the view of the discrete transaction as
paradigmatic of all contract transactions and drew attention to the "relational con-
tract." See Whitford, fan Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 545, 546. Professor Macneil's scholarship urged that oontract law be
differentiated to account For these differing contexts. For discussions of Macneil's
relational theories, see Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. UL. REV.
1018 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Macneil, Economic Analysis]; Macneil, Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Macneil, Presentlationt: Whitford, supra; cf. Henderson, supra note
16, at 374. Henderson asserts that one might expect oourts to be particularly re-
sponsive to promissory estoppel claims "when a relationship, usually contractual,
has already been established," id. at 373, and the promisee is suing the promisor on
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pears to operate independently of status, so that even plaintiffs ap-
pearing to have equal or similar economic status and knowledge of
the relevant contract law to that of defendants may be enmeshed in
broader ties and thus able to prevail.':"
The classical system was premised on the assumption that all
transactions were discrete.':" The system did not take account of en-
meshment in its rules. As described below, however, enmeshment is
now factored into case analysis, with plaintiffs enmeshed in broader
ties more likely to succeed in promissory estoppel actions.'?'
The impact of enmeshment is illustrated in Esquire Radio &
Electronics v. Montgomery Ward & Co!·· The plaintiff Esquire and
the defendant had a business relationship for over twenty years. At
first, the plaintiff produced radios for resale under the labels of other
retailers and producers, including Ward. As electronic equipment
manufacturing shifted abroad, the plaintiffs role changed to a "mid-
dleman vendor.I"?" Under this arrangement, Esquire took delivery of
goods that Ward had ordered from overseas manufacturers and had
I
a waiver on which the promisee has detrimentally relied. In such enmeshed contexts
and "[ijn light of the fact that a formal relationship exists, the risk of serious reli-
ance ... is high." [d. at 374. Henderson's analysis is consistent with the view ex-
pressed here that courts should be more receptive to promissory estoppel claims in
the context of ongoing relations. However, Professor Macneil would argue that the
difficulty with the neoclassical efforts, reflected in the case law, to "build ... flexi-
bility into formal contracts," is that it merely "modif[ies] the wisdom of the law of
discrete transactions, without at the same time building relational foundations."
Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 926 n.90 (quoting I. MACNEIL, THE NEW
SOCIALCONTRACTTHEORY74 (1980)). See generally Farber & Matheson, supra
note 16, at 925·30. These authors also discuss the importance of an ongoing rela-
tionship as an outcome predictive factor.
Although this Article supports Macneil's conclusions that the classical model
failed to adequately consider the increased importance of long-term relations in
fashioning the rules of formation, it differs from Macneil in believing that courts, at
least in the promissory estoppel area, have incorporated "relational foundations"
into contract law through the reliance on the three factors identified here in decid-
ing enforceability questions.
102. See, e.g., infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
103. See Macneil, supra note 59, at 859. Two major elements that Professor
Macneil identifies as characteristic of the discrete transaction are "little personal
involvement of the parties," and "no significant past relations nor likely future rela-
tions." [d. at 856-57 (footnote omitted).
104. See cases cited infra note 121; see also Farber & Matheson, supra note
16, at 925, in which the authors attribute, in part, the expanding reach of promis-
sory estoppel in case law to the presence of an ongoing relationship.
One author recognized the importance of the relational contract as a factor
favoring liability, but ultimately dismissed the connection between a relational con-
tract and liability as mereiy accidental. Feinman, Historical Perspective, supra note
16, at 1383. This Article disagrees with Professor Feinman's conclusion.
105. 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. [d. at 791.
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already paid for. Esquire would pay Ward for the imported goods,
expecting reimbursement and a commission when Ward later repur-
chased the goods. The provision for immediate payment from Es-
quire gave Ward the security of available inventory without having
to actually pay for the goods until needed.
The buy-back arrangement between Ward and Esquire re-
mained unwritten.w? Therefore, when inventories accumulated, Es-
quire demanded reassurance that Ward would honor its buy-back
promise. Ward not only furnished such assurances but also urged
Esquire to increase inventories, adding that "[y]ou ought to carry
more and not be so tight on the quantities. "10.
Although the Esquire court did not expressly predicate promis-
sory estoppel liability on the enmeshment between the parties, the
court deemed the enmeshment sufficiently important to invoke
promissory estoppel.tw The court emphasized the enmeshed relation-
ship between the parties when it referred to Esquire as "nominally a
'vendor'" but in reality "a service affiliate of Ward.T'!" Their rela-
tionship was further solidified when Ward requested Esquire to re-
frain from working for its competitors.''' Esquire acquiesced and
worked almost exclusively for Ward. Eventually "over 95% of Es-
quire's resources were devoted to servicing Ward's requirements."ll2
Vastoler v. American Can Co.''' illustrates the application of
enmeshment in an employment context. The defendant had em-
ployed the plaintiff for thirty-four years spanning 1937-1978.''' In
1963, the plaintiff reluctantly accepted a promotion from hourly
worker to salaried supervisor.Ps He accepted only after receiving as-
surances that the defendant would credit him fully for all past years
of service when determining his pension benefits.P" When the plain-
tiff retired in 1978, however, the defendant refused to pay him the
full pension benefits promised.P"
When the plaintiff sued to receive the unpaid benefits, the dis-
trict court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.v'"
The Third Circuit, however, found sufficient evidence of the plain-
107. [d.
108. [d. at 792.
109. The court characterized the relationship as "a long-standing business re-
lationship" of over twenty years. [d. at 790.
110. [d. at 795.
Ill. [d. at 794.
112. !d. at 791.
113. 700 F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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tiffs detrimental reliance to remand the case for trial.':" The appel-
late court in Vastoler apparently recognized the inherent inequality
of the situation and went out of its way to find actionable detrimen-
tal reliance.P" The Vastoler decision is consistent with many deci-
sions in the employment context in which courts have welcomed
promissory estoppel claims.'!' Therefore, in employee relationships
119. [d. The district court found that although the defendant had indeed
promised the plaintiff full pension benefits, the plaintiff had not suffered any disad-
vantage that warranted applying promissory estoppel. /d. at 917-18.
120. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 912. In evaluating the plaintiffs
detriment, the court disregarded the fact that the plaintiff earned more as a supervi-
sor than as an hourly employee, and identified several other sources of the plaintiffs
detriment. First, the plaintiff refrained from seeking new jobs because of his antici-
pated pension benefits. 700 F.2d at 919. Second, the court emphasized the need to
consider the "human dynamics and anxieties inherent in supervisory positions." Id.
When he accepted the supervisory position, the plaintiff assumed responsibility for
his own job performance as well as for supervision and evaluation of the daily per-
formances of approximately fifty workers. The position involved daily tension. The
court, declining to follow the district court by quantifying detriment in "purely fi-
nancial terms," id., concluded that, because the plaintiffs increased levels of stress
and anxiety could constitute adequate detriment, the case warranted a trial. The
court further noted that the plaintiff also may have relied detrimentally on his em-
ployer's promise by not increasing his personal pension fund contributions. Id.
121. The likelihood that a long-term employee will forego contract formalities
has prompted courts to apply promissory estoppel theory when a long-term employ-
ment relationship exists. See Hass v. Darigold Dairy Prods. Co., 751 F.2d 1096 (9th
Cir. 1985) (employee relied on union representative's and employer's assertions that
she would maintain 11 year seniority status despite change from full-time to part-
time work); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir, 1980)
(employee retired early, relying on employer's promise that pension benefits would
be based on employee's 11 years of service with both employer and its predecessor
company).
If the parties are enmeshed in a franchise or are enmeshed as a result of long-
term bargining towards a franchise, the plaintiff is also likely to succeed. See
Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123; Alpark Distribs., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605,
600 P.2d 229 (1979); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d
255,616 P.2d 644 (1980); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133
N. W.2d 267 (1965). A particularly sophisticated or knowledgeable plaintiff, how-
ever, will not prevail on a promissory estoppel claim despite enmeshment in broader
ties through a franchise relationship. RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 686
F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1982) (refusal to entertain a promissory estoppel claim despite
a long-standing relationship when plaintiff and defendant were both businessmen
with no obvious disparities).
Courts are increasingly receptive to promises made by parties enmeshed in an
ongoing employment relationship. Discharged employees are likely to prevail on
promises of job security made by their employers. See. e.g., Presto v. Sequoia Sys.,
lnc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass. 1986); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio
St. 3d 100,483 N.E.2d 150 (1985); cf Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West,
716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Touissaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, lnc., 99 N.J. 284, 491
A.2d 1257 (1985); Thompson v, St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d
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the reach of section 90 is potentially all encompassing because of the
presence of an ongoing relationship.
C. Do the Parties Have a Relationship of Trust or Confidence?
When the parties are enmeshed in a relationship of trust and
confidence, the plaintiffs are particularly likely to prevail on promis-
sory estoppel claims. An element of trust is likely to cause a plaintiff
to rely detrimentally and to forego insistence on contract formalities
or on explicit unequivocal signals by the promisor as to the desired
promisee conduct, which would otherwise be required to establish a
contract claim.v" For this reason, parties enmeshed in a relationship
of trust and confidence are often impaired in their ability to protect
themselves through the bargaining process, making such cases ripe
for promissory estoppel relief.
1091 (1984). These latter cases offer employees protection on the alternate ground
of unilateral contract formation. See Pettit, Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L.
REV. 551 (1983).
Courts are receptive to other promises made in the employment context, such
as promises to reimburse expenses. See, e.g., Hux v. Woodcock, 130 Ill. App. 3d
721,474 N.E.2d 958 (1985) (plaintiff who paid costs relying on promise to convey
real estate prevailed against law partners). Courts are receptive to promises regard-
ing pensions made in the context of a long-term employment relation. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 60. Finally, courts also are receptive to promises made in the
context of an ongoing business relationship. See, e.g., Esquire Radio, 804 F.2d 787.
Enmeshment in broader ties also has affected the outcome of cases between
plaintiff insureds and defendant insurers. In these cases, the more extensive the
dealings between the parties, the more likely the plaintiff insured is to prevail
against a defendant insurer. See R.E. KEETON, supra note 73, at § 2.5(a) n.13;
Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.O. Wash. 1961); United Farm Bureau Mul.
Ins. Co. v, Cook, 463 N.E.2d 522, 528 (Ind. 1984) (not error for trial court to
decide insurance agent owed insured a duty in light of "long-established relationship
of entrustment"); Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assocs. v. Continental Cas. Co., 110
Mich. App. 410, 313 N.W.2d 299 (1981) (when defendant had handled plaintiffs
insurance needs for 10 years a special relationship existed); Hellbaum v . Burwell &
Morford, I Wash. App. 694, 463 P.2d 225 (1969). On the other hand, the plaintiff
is less likely to prevail if the court finds an absence of prior dealings. See Nowell v.
Dawn-Leavitt Agency, Inc., 127 Ariz. 48, 52, 617 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1980) ("entire
record reveals a course of dealing between the parties which negates the kind of
relationship of entrustment and initiative which is the basis for liability in Hardt v,
Brink."); McCall v, Marshall, 398 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. 1965) (no duty to provide
additional insurance protection absent prior dealings between the parties).
122. The need to recognize this factor in promissory estoppel case law is sup-
ported by its recognized importance in other areas of contract law. For example, the
doctrine of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provides that in
cases in which the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment to furnish suitable
goods and the seller has reason to know of such reliance, a warranty that the goods
are suitable will be implied. See V.C.C. § 2-315 (1977); see also supra note 73
(citing insurance cases in which courts imposed obligations when a party without
technical knowledge trusted and therefore relied on the expertise of the other party).
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In many cases in which plaintiffs have successfully claimed
promissory estoppel a relationship of trust and confidence was pre-
sent."· Indeed, cases involving relationships of trust and confidence
were among the historically significant cases on which Corbin relied
in proposing the adoption of promissory estoppel theory.
In Larabee v. BoothP" for example, the relationship of trust
between the plaintiffs and the defendant caused the plaintiffs to
forego insisting on the traditional contract requisites. The defendant
owned a farm subject to her mother's life estate. At a time when the
plaintiffs and defendant were good friends, they discussed the plain-
123. A relationship of trust or confidence is also likely to occur when the
defendant owes fiduciary-like duties to the plaintiffs. In such contexts, a plaintiff
generally will prevail despite his failure to achieve explicitly reciprocal or formalized
bargaining. See. e.g., Allen v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 606 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.
1979) (broker-dealer liable to its customer on a promise "to delay enforcement of
... margin call" until plaintiffs return); Hurd v. Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630
(D.N.J. 1976) (employees prevailed on promissory estoppel claim against pension
plan trustees); Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe, 96 Cal. App. 3d 627, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1979) (plaintiff corporation prevailed, alleging reliance on promise of its
director with fiduciary-like duties to the plaintiff); see also Graddick v. First Farm-
ers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 453 So.2d 1305 (Ala. 1984) (promissory estoppel
claim by 90 year old widow, a trust beneficiary, against bank/trustee upheld); Rick-
etts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51,77 N.W. 365 (1898); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y.
479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923).
Hardesty v. Richardson, 44 Md. 617 (1876), illustrates how the existence of a
trust and confidence relationship can affect the outcome. The plaintiff purchased a
farm for his son, with the understanding that his son would occupy and operate the
farm. The plaintiff promised to convey title to his son "as soon as some preliminary
arrangements were made." [d. at 622. The son immediately took possession of the
farm, made extensive, costly improvements upon it, and paid all taxes and insurance
premiums relating to the property. [d. at 621-22. After the son had lived on and
operated the farm for 5 years, the plaintiff brought an ejectment action to remove
his son from the land. [d. at 618. The court denied the plaintiffs ejectment claim
and instead ordered the plaintiff to convey the land to his son. The state supreme
court affirmed. [d. at 625.
Although the Hardesty court did not apply the promissory estoppel doctrine
explicitly, it decided the case based upon detrimental reliance. Thus, Hardesty is a
promissory estoppel case in fact if not in name. The supreme court held that the
son's actions to operate and improve the farm "were induced by and made upon the
faith and in consideration of the father's promise to convey the land." [d. at 624.
Because the son relied on his father's promise, the court concluded that the plaintiff
had made an irrevocable gift of the property. /d.
Corbin noted this opinion in his discussion of cases in which a promise that
induced reliance was enforced notwithstanding the absence of consideration. IA A.
CORBIN, supra note 5, § 194, at 195-96 n.7. In Corbin's view, the promisee's reli-
ance upon the promise rendered the promise enforceable. [d. at §§ 194-95. Such
cases, however, also can be explained as resulting from a relationship of trust and
confidence. In most, if not all, of the cases in which an oral promise to convey land
was enforced, close ties that created trust and confidence existed between the
parties.
124, 463 N.E.2d. 487 (Ind. App. 1984).
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tiffs' proposed construction of a summer home on the land subject to
the life estate. Subsequently, the plaintiffs requested permission to
build a permanent home on the land. The defendant agreed to the
plaintiffs' request and entered into an agreement to convey the land
to the plaintiffs upon the death of the life tenant. In reliance on that
promise and written agreement to convey, the plaintiffs built their
permanent house on the land. After the life tenant died, the defend-
ant refused to convey the land. The plaintiffs sued for specific
performance.'"
The court concluded that the plaintiffs could recover the land
based on promissory estoppel. By emphasizing the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties, the plaintiffs were able to persuade the
court, first, that the defendant reasonably should have expected the
plaintiffs to detrimentally rely on the promise to convey and, second,
that the reliance was reasonable. The court stated: "[I]n light of the
parties' friendship at the time of this promise, the court was justified
in finding that [the defendants) should reasonably have expected this
promise to induce [the plaintiffs) to act. "".
In contrast, the court in Walker v. Iretonv" ruled against the
plaintiff after finding that a relationship of trust or confidence did
not exist. In Walker, the plaintiff made an oral contract with the
defendant to purchase the defendant's farm for a thoroughbred horse
operation. Difficulties arose after the oral agreement. The defendant
offered the plaintiff $200 to cancel the agreement. When the plain-
tiff refused, the defendant breached the oral agreement by refusing
to convey the land. When the plaintiff sought specific performance,
the defendant moved for summary judgment asserting the statute of
frauds. ". The court rejected the plaintiffs promissory estoppel de-
fense to the statute of frauds, stating that "there is no claim that
there was any relationship of trust or confidence between the
parties. »raa
125. [d. at 489.
126. [d. at 491.
127. 221 Kan. 314, 559 P.2d 340 (1977).
128, [d, at 315-17, 559 P.2d at 342-43.
129. [d. at 322, 559 P.2d at 346. The court found that a relationship of trust
and confidence did not exist between the parties because the plaintiff and the de-
fendant only had a "speaking acquaintance." [d. at 315, 559 P.2d at 342.
The absence of a relationship of trust or confidence also might explain the reo
sults in cases in which the parties are negotiating at arms- length a deal to consum-
mate a one-shot discrete transaction. See. e.g., Reprosystem, B,V, v. SCM Corpora-
tion, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); Jungmann v, St.
Regis Paper Co., 682 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1982); Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608
F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1979).
Even when promises are made between parties already involved in business
dealings, a promissory estoppel claim is unlikely to succeed if the defendant has
actively discouraged the plaintiff from trusting the defendant. See. e.g., Jackson
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III. DOCTRINAL ApPLICATIONS OF THE PROMISE REQUIREMENT IN
SECTION 90 REFLECTS THE STATUS, KNOWLEDGE, AND
ENMESHMENT FACTORS
Doctrinal applications of a key element of section 90-the
promise13°-reflect the impact of the factors discussed above and re-
inforce the internal coherence lent by that framework.
Some scholars would challenge the purported coherence, argu-
ing that only wishful and naive thinking supposes a rational ordering
scheme can be found. For example, Professor Feinman would dispute
the doctrinal coherence of the case law in general and of the promise
element in particular. He argues that courts cannot achieve coher-
ence because they are attempting to serve the contradictory goals of
(I) acting as a neutral facilitator of private wills and (2) acting as a
mechanism for public regulation of the bargaining process.':" There-
fore, cases applying the promise requirements of promissory estoppel
necessarily lack coherence'" and reflect ad hoc approaches taken to
this requirement. "[C)ourts are variously strict and flexible"!sa in
determining the degree of commitment and clarity required to make
a promise actionable. Under the strict view, courts "carefully distin-
guish ... promises, which are future oriented, from statements of
belief which concern only the present,"'" and require the promise to
"be definite and unequivocal."135More liberal courts relax the strin-
gent standards and allow promises to be "inferred. "136Courts will
even grant recovery to plaintiffs alleging reliance on promises that
would not have been actionable under a harsh view because they
were "preliminary or conditional."137
This Article posits that the incoherence in cases interpreting the
promise requirement can and should be rationalized in terms of the
theory suggested here. The incoherence in doctrinal application is
Rapid Delivery Serv., Inc. v, Jones Truck Lines, lnc., 641 F. Supp. 81,86-87 (S.D.
Miss. 1986) (plaintiff had no basis to rely on ccntinuation of relationship when
defendant had specifically cautioned against such expectation).
130. The promise requirement is the "principal issue in applying promissory
estoppel." Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 690.
131. [d. at 690.
132. [d. at 689-96.
133. [d. at 691.
134. [d.
135. [d.
136. Id ..at 692. "This standard may be met not only by a particular promise
or representation, but also by general statements of policy or practice." ld.; see, e.g.,
Hurd v, Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976), cited in Feinman, Judicial
Method, supra note 8, at 692 n.68.
137. Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 694. Adherents to a strict
view would argue that reliance on such promises is inherently unreasonable and
therefore; not compensable under § 90. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CON~
TRACTS§ 90 ccmment b (1981).
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only superficial; if one probes the cases involving the promise re-
quirement, they too can be rationalized in terms of the theory sug-
gested here. If a court finds natural barriers to explicitly reciprocal
or formalized contracting, it is likely to embrace promissory estoppel
claims. Absent such barriers, a court is likely to adopt a restricted
view of the proof of the elements of section 90.
Variations in how courts interpret the commitment needed to
make a promise actionable become apparent by comparing Hurd v.
Hutnik'w with R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co.139 In Hurd,
the plaintiffs, retired employees, sued the defendants-employers for
terminating the multi-employer pension fund under which they drew
benefits. The plaintiffs contended that by terminating the fund, the
defendants breached a promise to pay pension benefits for the retir-
ees' lifetimes. The court upheld the promissory estoppel claim de-
spite its finding that "there is no language in the collective bargain-
ing agreements or in the trust agreement which explicitly guarantees
a pension for life.""0 In this context, the court was willing to find
the promise "implied in several . . . provisions of the pension
plan. "141 The court was also willing in the employment context to
overlook language preserving to the trustees a right to terminate the
trust,""
In another context, and in the absence of natural barriers to
orthodox contracting, the court might well have found the reliance
by the Hurd plaintiffs unreasonable. In R.G. Group, the plaintiffs
were negotiating to acquire a franchise. From May to December 3,
1982 the parties met, exchanged a standard form franchise agree-
ment, and discussed the franchise's projected territorial limits. By
December 3, when the parties reached agreement on the important
terms, the defendant reassured the plaintiff that they had "a hand-
shake deal.'?"
In the context of a complex transaction involving a $2,000,000
investment, trade secrets, and numerous other matters, the R.G.
Group court was unwilling to find an actionable promise. The court
138. 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976).
139. 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984).
140. 419 F. Supp. at 655; cf. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Na!'1 Bank-West, 716
F.2d 378. 385 (6th Cir. 1'983) (jury question on whether employee manual consti-
tuted implied contractual right to be terminated only for cause deemed jury ques-
lion); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606. 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981)
(implied contractual right not to be terminated without cause despite written at-will
contract is jury question).
141. 419 F. Supp. at 655.
142. [d. at 656. "Though the agreement provides that 'the trust may be ter-
minated ... ' this Court holds that the collective bargaining agreement ... did
not extinguish the employers' contractual obligation to their retired employees." [d.
143. 751 F.2d at 73.
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held that it was clear to the parties that "any promise or agreement
was conditional upon the signing of a written contract. Under those
circumstances', there never was a 'clear and unambiguous promise'
"144
In both R.G. Group and Hurd, the defendants made promises to
the plaintiffs that could have been a basis for reliance. Moreover, in
each case, the defendant took certain steps to make reliance on the
promise unreasonable. In R.G. Group, the defendants made contra-
dictory statements. On the one hand, the defendant promised a deal
and on the other indicated no contract would exist until the execu-
tion of a formal contract. In Hurd, there were indications that the
promises were not entirely unambiguous. The court itself recognized
the absence of an explicit guarantee of a lifetime pension as well as a
retained right of the trustees to terminate the trust under certain
circumstances. In R.G. Group, the court accepted the promisor's ma-
neuvering to prevent contract formation. The court refused to con-
sider the availability of a promissory estoppel claim despite the de-
fendants' assurances of a deal. However, in Hurd where certain
factors undercut the promise being sued on, the court was willing to
analyze the case on promissory estoppel grounds. The difference in
result is explainable in terms of the different factual contexts.
IV. THE SUCCESS RATE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN CERTAIN
FACT SETTINGS: DOES THE EXPLANATION WARRANT A RULE OF
LIABILITY?
Disparities in status and knowledge, relations of trust and confi-
dence, and the presence of an ongoing relationship may be predictive
of outcome in a large number of cases. These factors tie into an as-
sent-based view of promissory estoppel. To arrive at assent-based lia-
bility as a "scientific explanation'v'" for the "welter of legal
microdata,">" including the case law, this Article explores why par-
ties dispense with explicitly reciprocal bargains or other contract for-
malities, and documents the importance of the presence of a plausi-
ble benefit to the promisor as another factor present in promissory
estoppel case law that seems to correlate closely with and be predic-
tive of case outcome.
Understanding why many modern courts relax the orthodox
contract requirements and embrace promissory estoppel in certain
settings requires an understanding of why their predecessors in-
sisted-at least in principle--on adherence to these rules147 as the
144. Id. at 79.
145. Michelman, supra note 23, at 1035.
146. /d.
147, The manipulable nature of the rules, as well as the "inescapable pres-
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exclusive arbiters of contract enforceability.
Classicists insisted on the use of legal formalities or explicit bar-
gaining because these signals assured the parties' assent to be
bound.':" If the promisor solemnizes his agreement to be bound
through a legal formality,':" there is not much doubt that he intends
to be bound, has done so deliberately, and is aware of the legal con-
sequences.vs Since parties do not normally "force the raw material
of meaning into defined and recognizable channels, "10' the use of a
formality with such channeling evidences an intent to be bound.
Bargain, like formalities, provides assurance of an intent to be
bound. If a promisor uses such express language as "in exchange
for," or "in consideration of," to link his promise with specified
promisee conduct, the promisor would surely consider himself better
off and bound should the promisee furnish the specified conduct.'"
Both the bargain theory and formalities, such as the statute of
frauds, can be rationalized in terms of an underlying concern with
consent. If these doctrines are regarded as the exclusive means for
measuring the presence of an enforceable exchange, however, some
promises will be unenforceable, even if the promisor intends to be
ence of policy choices," made adhering to rules an ideal more than a reality.
Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 833, 844; See also Gordon, supra
note I, at 1025-26. This is the essence of the realist critique whose scholars devoted
"[a] great deal of scholarship .. ,showing that legal directives that looked general
and formally realizable were in fact indeterminate." Kennedy, Private Law Adjudi-
cation, supra note 8, at 1700. Professor Gordon would denominate this critique as
an "internal empirical" one aimed at demonstrating the variance between "case out-
comes" and "doctrinal theory." Gordon, Tentative Outline. supra note 41, at 20.
The classicists' insistence on the possibility of a neutral regime of rules is ex-
plained by some scholars as part of an "ideology ... that ... legitimates an ille-
gitimate status quo." Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 853. Cloaking
policy choices with the aura of objective neutrality helps to promote a perception of
the essential fairness of the system. Id.
148. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 357.
The offer-acceptance rules which dominate contract formation reflect the
importance we attach to bargains arrived at through the interplay of pri-
vate interests. The general objective of these assorted rules is to guarantee
parties seeking an exchange extensive freedom to express, or to refuse to
express, a willingness to be bound.
{d.
149. See generally Fuller, supra note 10.
150. As Professor Barnett explains, "[t]he voluntary use of a recognized for-
mality by a promisor manifests to a promisee an intention to be legally bound in as
unambiguous a manner as possible .... Formal contracts ought [therefore] to be
an 'easy' case of contractual enforcement .... " Barnett, supra note 5, at 311.
151. See Fuller, supra note 10, at 802.
152. Bargaining, like the use of formalities, may be "presumptive" evidence
of assent. Barnett, supra note 5, at 309. A party who has used this "simple .. ,
external test of enforceability," Fuller, supra note I0, at 801, has likely intended his
promise to be binding.
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bound.'"'
If consensual exchanges are denied enforcement under orthodox
contract theory, then one must look beyond consent to justify and
explain the classical adherence to bargain and/or formalities as ex-
clusive consent standards. The explanation for embracing these ap-
proaches as exclusive "indicia of consent"!" lies in their previously
perceived benefits. First, it was implicitly assumed that using these
two standards for ascertaining consent would, because of their "rule-
ness" quality!" and "formal realizability,"!" minimize judicial in-
terference and discretion and, thereby, preserve the core realm of
private autonomy.!" Because the rules were "technical, facilitative
rules">" that could be administered in a neutral, objective fashion,
they were almost, if not quite, self-executing. Instances of unwanted
judicial discretion were thereby rninimized.v" These rules yielded
additional benefits by causing people-economic actors-to "invest
in formal proficiency'v'" by learning the rules. Additionally, the
rules facilitated economic exchange.!" Without such rules, parties
would not invest, fearing that a capricious court, interpreting a
nonformal "standard,"'·' would exercise discretion and overturn
their agreements. Thus, although administering such rules might
cause occasional injustices because the rules might be "over or un-
derinclusive,"?" generally such rules would "remove the inhibiting
153. Barnett, supra note 5, at 313 n.189. This is so because, as Professor
Fuller recognized, these formalities are not universally necessary to show assent.
There are situations in which "the guaranties that the formality would afford are
rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of which the transaction
arises .... " Fuller, supra note 10, at 805 (emphasis omitted).
154. Barnett, supra note 5, at 313.
155. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication. supra note 8, at 1687.
156. ld. According to Professor Kennedy:
The first dimension of rules is that of formal realizability .... The ex-
treme of formal realizability is a directive to an official that requires him
to respond to the presence together of each of a list of easily distinguisha-
ble factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a determinate way.
Ihering used the determination of legal capacity by sole reference to age as
a prime example of a formally realizable definition of liability ....
ld.
157. Restricting the judicial role to the application of rules could preserve
autonomy in part because of the "abstract" nature of the rules. Feinman, Judicial
Method, supra note 8, at 682. "The first [abstract) method appeared to serve indi-
vidual freedom by preventing judges from imposing their own values .... " ld.
158. Gordon, supra note I, at 1025.
159. Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 682.
160. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1698.
161. ld.
162. See Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1982).
163. Professor Kennedy acknowledges that one well-recognized cost of a sys-
tem of formal rules is its "over and underinclusiveness." Kennedy, Private Law Ad-
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effect on action that occurs when one's gains are subject to sporadic
legal catastrophe."'" Because of these benefits, courts willingly re-
fused to enforce noncomplying agreements.
Other means of showing consent are, however, at least as com-
patible with preserving individual autonomy.r" Therefore, the true
explanation for restricting evidence of consent to formalities and/or
bargain theory may lie in underlying assumptions about human be-
havior made by the classical formalist. The classicists conceived of
the "social world as composed of independent freedom seeking indi-
viduals"'·· who would readily become adept in the rules of orthodox
contract formation. They assumed "that the rules of appellate doc-
trine are instantly incorporated in the incentive structures of individ-
uals situated like the litigants .... "'.7 Moreover, "[p]ower relation
... disparities ... [were] usually treated as nonexistent or irrele-
vant .... "'66 The classical model of reality also assumed that par-
ties generally were involved in discrete one-shot transactions with no
prospect for an ongoing relationship.v" Parties were deemed fully
capable of anticipating all performance problems at the moment of
contract formation.'?"
When these assumptions prevail, no natural barriers to, or rea-
sons for dispensing with, explicitly reciprocal promise formulation
are deemed to exist. All parties are able to protect their self-inter-
ests.'"! A failure to comply with the orthodox rules may well evi-
dence an intention not to be bound.
A. Identifying Causes
If one or more of the factors discussed above is present, parties
may fail, for a variety of reasons, to achieve an agreement enforcea-
ble under orthodox contract law even though the agreement evi-
dences an assent-based obligation. A discussion of these reasons
follows.
judication. supra note 8. at 1689 (citation omitted).
164. ld.
165. See supra note 153.
166. Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 832.
167. Gordon, supra note I, at 1026. Gordon stated that this assumption ap-
plies to the realists but it would also apply to the classicists.
168. Gordon, Tentative Outline, supra note 41, at 21.
169. See supra note 101.
170. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 101.
171. Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 832.
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1. Differential Capacity to Discover the Applicable Rules
Parties with disparate status may also have different capacities
to discover the legal rules governing their transactions! 72 Therefore,
the more ignorant party may rely to his detriment on another's
promise. This may occur even if the promisor does not explicitly sig-
nal his intent to be bound upon the furnishing of such reliance and
even without a formalized bargain. The ignorant party may not real-
ize that legal rules will preclude enforcing promises that fail to sat-
isfy orthodox criteria. In these situations, it may be appropriate to
establish a liability rule that is consistent with the natural beliefs of
those least able to know the law and that places the burden on those
who can discover the law!73
2. The Party With Superior Status Will Effectuate
Necessary Formalities
Another reason why the weaker party may rely even if the
promisor has not signalled unequivocally his willingness to be bound
on the basis of such reliance or has not formalized the agreement is
that the promisee may assume that the party with the superior status
has taken appropriate steps to make the promise enforceable. If the
promisor's actions signal an intent to be bound, albeit in a less than
fully explicit manner or without a formal written agreement, the
promisee likely will assume that such explicit signals or other for-
malities are not required.
3. Congruence of Interest Between the Parties
Parties with inferior status, such as an employee or an insured,
may assume that their interests are coterminous with those of the
superior party-the promisor employer or insurer. Therefore, unless
the promisor makes it otherwise clear, the promisee will assume that
he can undertake reliance expenditures on behalf of the promisor
that will be compensable because they were undertaken for the
172. Classical formalists would not recognize a differential capacity of the
parties to know and act according to the rules. Under the classicist view, each party
had natural abilities to become "proficient" in the rules. Kennedy, Private Law Ad-
judication, supra note 8, at 1698.
173. This result would satisfy those concerned with promoting efficient re-
sults. The liability rule would encourage the party with superior knowledge of the
legal rules to share that information. This approach is consistent with that taken in
the context of nondisclosure. There, because the more knowledgeable party "may be
the better preventer" of the loss in the form of unreimbursed reliance and because
"of his superior access to relevant information," the law allocates the risk of the
mistake to that party. Kronrnan, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of
Contracts, in THE ECONOMICSOF CONTRACTLAW 115-16 (A. Kronman & R. Pos-
ner eds. 1979).
___ ,..- ".~jj~<.".~"'\o.o.
- ...."'- -- ---~--...........-~-- ",-
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promisor's benefit. It is as if the promisor, in discussing with the
promisee an undertaking that the promisor might be willing to make
in the future on terms that cannot or were not struck in an explicitly
reciprocal form, tells the promisee: "In exchange for your taking val-
uable initial steps toward making it possible for us to finalize our
subsequent relations, I promise to keep you informed of any changes
in my willingness to later reach a more completely explicit bar-
gain."v" Thus, the promisee should be permitted to assume that the
promisor will act in their joint interests or will inform the promisee
that if he relies, he will be acting at his peril.
4. Inferior Economic Position of One Party
Even if the promisee knows contract law rules, his inferior sta-
tus might indicate less economic leverage':" and cause him to rely
while awaiting the promisor's explicit signalling. Thus, a potential
employee might hesitate to insist on explicit bargaining with the em-
ployer, to avoid appearing disloyal or lacking team spirit.':" In such
situations courts might understandably relax bargain requirements.
5. Substitution of Trust for Formalities
Parties involved in a relationship of trust may feel that such
trust obviates the need for an explicit communication from the
promisor unequivocally indicating the basis on which he would be
bound or other formalities.t?" The promisor may actually hope that
the promisee will rely on less explicit signals. Parties who trust each
other are unlikely to perceive explicitly reciprocal communications or
174. See supra note 28.
175. According to Professor Priest, the role of lower economic leverage fig-
ured prominently in the development of the exploitation theory. See Priest, A The-
ory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1300 (1981). For criti-
cism of this assumption, see Whitford, Comment on a Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 91 YALE L.J. 1371, 1378-79 n.29 (1982).
176. As Professor Macneil asserts, "a huge residue of non-assertiveness re-
mains explainable only by the willingness to sacrifice immediate exchange-gains to
increase relational security." Macneil, Economic Analysis, supra note 101, at 1048;
see also Macaulay, Non-Contracrual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
177. An example outside the contractual context is the principal-agent rela-
tionship. In this context, one would expect "complex fee functions," Arrow, supra
note 28, at 48. Yet, reality is quite different; "observed schedules are almost always
simple." Prall & Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS' THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS16 (J. Prall & R. Zeckhauser eds.
1985). Part of the explanation lies in factors that most analytic models fail to con-
sider - "friendship, family, and connections," ld. Thus, by inference, principals fail
to work out fully contingent, highly specified arrangements because, when trust is
present, the need to be fully explicit diminishes.
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formalized written communications as necessary. As Professors Far-
ber and Matheson assert, "[w]here such relationships are highly in-
terdependent, economic benefit is likely to be sought through infor-
mal understandings that reinforce the relationship, rather than
through discrete bargains."?"
A trust relationship operated against explicit bargaining or
other formalities in Vastoler v. American Can Co."o In Vastoler, a
thirty-four-year employment relationship led an employee to assume
he could rely on an informal understanding. Also, the employee may
have dispensed with contract formalities regarding the pension in or-
der to preserve the long-term relationship. The employee depends on
the employer for continued financial support. Therefore, the em-
ployee naturally relies on the employer's assertions and does not risk
irritating an employer by seeking a formal contractual obligation.
The preceding discussion illustrates how the weaker, less knowl-
edgeable, or trusting party might fail to comply with the explicit re-
ciprocal bargain requirements or might dispense with contract for-
malities. Similar results are likely to occur in ongoing relationships,
even among business entities with equal status, economic power, and
legal sophistication.
6. Misleading Conduct
The absence of an explicitly reciprocal or formalized contract
may be explained by misleading conduct of the promisor. The de-
fendant promisor may deliberately and affirmatively assuage the
promisee's fears of the defendant's nonperformance by insisting that
the parties have a deal. In this way the defendant promisor attempts
to secure the desired promisee conduct without formally committing
himself to an orthodox contract. The conduct of Montgomery Ward
in Esquire Radio & Electronics v. Montgomery Wardv" typifies
such misleading conduct. When Esquire demanded reassurance that
Wards would honor the buy-back arrangement, Wards replied, "We
will take the parts. "181 In ongoing relationships, such reassurances
diminish the demand for any orthodox contractual guarantees of per-
formance. As in Esquire, the promisor provides such reassurances to
induce the promisee to perform and to forego an explicitly reciprocal
or formalized contract. Such reassurances understandably induce
courts to grant promissory estoppel relief""'
178. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 925-26.
179. 700 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1983); see a/so Farber & Matheson, supra note
16, at 910-12.
180. 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986).
18 I. Id. at 793.
182. In the following cases, misleading conduct seemed to be coupled with a
benefit to the defendant promisor. See, e.g., id; In re Texas Mortgage Servs. Corp.,
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7. Information Gaps
In the situations considered thus far, the less knowledgeable
party may forego contract formalities. In some instances, however,
neither party may know enough to explicitly and formally contract.
The promisor may confront the natural barrier of the unforseeability
of certain future events and thus be unwilling to commit to the
promise that he might undertake in the future-the "projected
promise." Nevertheless, one party may willingly commit in the form
of a promise short of the projected promise. He may be willing to
make a generalized performance commitment. Such commitment
might take the form of an agreement by the promisor to exercise
reasonable efforts to facilitate reaching the point at which the par-
ties can be more specifically reciprocal in orthodox categories of
time, price, quantity and quality. On this basis the other party may
willingly rely on the promise in ways that benefit and increase the
information available to the promisor. If one can find evidence of
such implicit contracting, perhaps the very same terms of genera-
lized performance commitments (such as "I will exercise reasonable
efforts to facilitate our reaching the point at which we can be more
explicitly reciprocal") apply to so many different contexts that par-
ties do not think of conveying them expressly. The heterodox terms
of implied bargain will always be similar, though the subject matter
will always be different. Thus, although the failure to achieve a for-
761 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1985) (bank's promise to mortgage broker to hold funds in
trust induced promisee to wire promisor $300,000, directly benefiting bank); Pedi
Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977) (promis-
sory estoppel available to plaintiff who received benefit of delivered goods and then
sought to avoid payment); Oates v. Teamster Affiliates Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp.
481 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (defendant's reassurances regarding pension directly benefited
defendant by increased Teamster union membership); Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35
Cal. 2d 621, 624, 220 P.2d 737, 740 (1950) (defendant's promises induced plaintiff
to "devote .. , his life to making the family venture a success"); Greenstein v.
Flatley, 19 Mass. App. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985) (defendant's reassurances that
parties had a deal was intentionally designed to benefit defendant in preserving his
options for a better deal); Moore Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d
934 (Tex. 1973) (statute of fraud's defense barred when the plaintiff detrimentally
relied on the defendant's promise by not bidding on land to defendant's benefit by
facilitating defendant's acquisition of the land); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
26 Wis. 2d 603, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (defendant promisor's constant and mis-
leading reassurances to promisee benefited promisor hy helping it locate most capa-
ble franchisee); cf Dulany Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220 Va. 502, 508, 260 S.E.2d 196,
200 (1979) (promises of severance benefits upheld when "termination pclicy
brought [company 1 industrial peace, avoidance of [employee 1 unrest, and conse-
quently a smooth termination of operations").
Reassurances that the parties have a deal will be discounted absent any evident
barriers to formalized contracting. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44 (dis-
cussing R.G. Group, 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir, 1984)).
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malized contract may be due to information gaps,''' sufficient rea-
sons may exist to enforce the parties' exchange.
B. Rationalizing Inconsistent Results in Terms of an
Explanatory Theory
The inconsistent results of promissory estoppel claims and the
causes of the failure to achieve explicitly reciprocal or formalized
contracts in certain fact settings suggest the need for "a descriptive
law that can order the data, organize them into an elegant, trench-
ant, parsimonious macro pattern, and impart to them an implicit
logic,"'" and a "hypothetical causal model""· to determine when
the law will attach binding effect to a promise.
1. Unequal Bargaining Power
One plausible theory for organizing promissory estoppel case
law is based on disparities in knowledge and/or bargaining power.
Although such a theory might be novel for promissory estoppel case
law, it has already helped to organize a multitude of cases in the
area of contract excuse and unconscionability.
In unconscionability contexts, courts apply a theory of unequal
bargaining power to provide relief, in the form of excuse, to parties
who would be bound under traditional contract doctrines.i'" The
court may excuse the weaker party from contract obligation if it per-
ceives unequal bargaining power when the terms of the bargain are
drafted by a seller on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,':" or the seller has
183. The effect of "differential information" on the specificity of principal-
agent relations is explored by Arrow, supra note 177. Professor Arrow's conclusions
are applicable in the promissory estoppel context if one views the promisor as the
agent and the promisee as the principal. Because the principal lacks information, he
appoints the promisor as his agent to act in his behalf. Due to information dispari-
ties, the promisee/principal cannot fully specify the contract terms but expects the
promisor to act for him unless notified otherwise.
184. Michelman, supra note 23, at 1035.
185. [d.
186. These parties would be bound for having contracted with another party
in a case lacking the facts to show fraud or duress, the only recognized excuses.
187. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983). In consumer transactions, courts invoke the unconscio-
nability doctrine when the contract is offered to the consumer buyer on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis with no opportunity to bargain over terms. The limitations of the indi-
vidual bargainers render the bargaining process suspect and justifies applying the
doctrine of contractual excuse. Williams v, Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) is a consumer transaction case exemplifying that a defect in
the bargaining process warrants scrutinizing the contract for substantive unconscio-
nability. See supra note 57.
Professor Kennedy has recently criticized the "rhetoric of unequal bargaining
power" as an insufficient justification for imposing compulsory terms in contract
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greater market leverage because of a monopoly or near monopoly
power .. •• or the buyer is unsophisticated relative to the seller.P" In
such cases, the court declines to enforce the contract because it is
skeptical that the contract reflects a true bargaln.v" and believes
that the stronger party has dictated terms and thus there is no true
assent.""
In promissory estoppel cases courts may display a similar con-
cern for procedural unfairness by imposing liability on the economi-
cally stronger or more knowledgeable party"·' Courts may strive to
protect promisees who, because of certain real-world disadvan-
tages, I.' have failed to protect themselves. The only difference in the
case of promissory estoppel is the remedy devised. Instead of ex-
panding the excuse for the less knowledgeable party, the court liber-
alizes the contract doctrines by imposing a liability rule that enables
that party affirmatively to recover.
law. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 8, at 614. Ken-
nedy's major difficulty with unequal bargaining power and the tests used to identify
cases of such inequality is their minimal value "to a person seriously committed to
achieving distributive objectives through law." ld. at 620. See alsa Dalton, supra
note 2, also criticizing the rhetoric purported to "polic]e] process, not substance."
ld. at 1026.
188. Priest, supra note 175, at 1300.
189. Rakoff, supra note 187, at 1179.
190. The law and economists would explain the courts' skepticism about the
bargain in the following terms. The bargain should not be enforced because it does
not contain terms that an average person in the promisor's circumstances would
consider within a range sufficient to make him better off. In such circumstances, the
court believes that a rule of excuse will cut through market imperfections, such as
asymmetry of information, more efficiently than private arrangements.
191. Kessler, supra note 23, at 632. For critiques of the problems inherent in
judging the voluntariness of agreements, see Dalton, supra note 2, at 1027.
192. Although courts sometimes intervene on behalf of less knowledgeable
parties in both the unconscionability and promissory estoppel contexts, and thus it
could be said that courts intervene in both contexts because of an informational
barrier to intelligent contracting, the situations are often quite different. In the un-
conscionability context, the barrier is primarily, it would seem, one of an unintelligi-
bility arising from some special deficiency of one of the parties, rather than from
the informational problem that results from (I) the need to expend resources to
collect information necessary to specify a deal, (2) unforeseeability of the future,
which affects all persons, or (3) the moral hazard problem, resulting from a party's
propensity to be opportunistic in performing his side of the exchange. See WILLIAM-
SON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 28, at 47. If this is correct, then the un-
conscionability rule is a judicial response to a barrier to contracting, but the barrier
stems from the special problems of the individual party such as low natural endow-
ment or prior failure to achieve and learn, in some cases, because of limited oppor-
tunities to do so. The barriers do not stem from other sources, such as the nature of
the performance or the expenses that must be incurred by parties to contract with
one another and 10 learn about one another's characteristics. These latter barriers
affect parties equal in endowment and achievement.
193. See supra notes 100, 183.
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2. Distributive or Altruistic Explanation
An altruism theory may also lend order to the variability in
promissory estoppel case law ..•• Because courts, in promissory estop-
pel cases, more readily grant relief to plaintiffs who seem to be dis-
advantaged economically relative to the defendant, they are arguably
"at work on the indispensable task of imagining an altruistic or-
der."·" Alternatively, courts may be deflecting the loss from a party
they perceive as unable to bear it. Judges, therefore, may be formu-
lating a kind of judicial anti-wealth redistribution rule and acting
out of "distributive motives."·'· Unspoken perceptions about fairness
and equity may influence judges to decide promissory estoppel cases
in favor of disadvantaged plaintiffs.v"
Professors Kessler and Gilmore recognized the erosion of the
bargain element and other formalities of contract law in terms of
underlying altruistic and distributive motives when they linked "the
erosion of rigid rules"·'· to the "socialization of our theory of con-
tract."··· The pattern of results identified in this Article may be in-
terpreted as consistent with a redistributive or altruistic agenda.
Those explanations, however, are not wholly satisfactory. They do
not explain why courts should impose liability only on the defend-
ants. If redistribution explained disparate results in promissory es-
toppel case law, then it would seem logical for the courts to develop
a liability rule that charged society as a whole. This approach would
have the greatest potential for promoting fair results by widely
spreading the cost of the promisee's 10ss."00The failure of courts to
194. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1778. Altruism is
a belief system or attitude that diverges sharply from the notions of individualism.
For a discussion of the principal content of these competing belief systems, see id. at
1717-22.
195. Id. at 1778. This view of the hidden judicial agenda is consistent with
the views of Professors Metzger and Phillips that the expansion of reliance is due to
the resurgence of a moral climate of decision making and a return to 18th century
substantive fairness notions. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 16, at 506-07.
196. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 8, at 570-71.
To some critics, using contract law as a vehicle for achieving individualized justice
as between parties with disparate status is desirable. Professor Kennedy, for exam-
ple, believes that "there is value as well as an element of real nobility in the judicial
decision to throw out, every time the opportunity arises, consumer contracts
designed to perpetuate the exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit."
Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1777.
197. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication. supra note 8, at 1777.
198. F. KESSLER& G. GILMORE.CONTRACTS.CASESAND MATERIALS1118
(2d ed. 1970), quoted in Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at
1686.
199. Id.
200. CALABRESI.THE COSTSOF ACCIDENTS:A LEGALANDECONOMICANAL-
YSIS39-68 (1970).
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carry distributive principles to their logical outcome suggests the in-
volvement of other factors. The redistributive and altruistic interpre-
tations are also deficient in failing to explain the results of cases in
which parties with relatively equal economic status and sophistica-
tion recover under the doctrine of promissory estoppel."?'
3. Persuasive Barriers, the Benefit Factor, and Assent-
Based Theory of Promissory Estoppel
Theories of procedural fairness on altruism or distributive fair-
ness are too narrow to explain and justify attaching binding effect to
certain promises. They do not explain why parties who are not disad-
vantaged either economically or in bargaining power should ever pre-
vail against similarly situated parties. They also fail to explain why
particular defendants, rather than society as a whole, should com-
pensate injured promisees. An explanatory structure that can ac-
count for the availability of promissory estoppel to both advantaged
and disadvantaged plaintiffs, and for confining liability to the class
of defendant promisors requires an examination of a second appar-
ently determinative factor in promissory estoppel case law-the pres-
ence of a plausible benefit to the promisor .202 The benefit to the
201. See Esquire Radio, 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986). The impact of redis-
tributive motives apparent in some such cases is not disputed here. However, "the
welter of [legal] microdata," Michelman, supra note 23, at 1035, requires an ex-
planatory theory that encompasses as large a universe of the cases as is possible.
This does not suggest that a theory must rationalize all of the cases to be legitimate.
If it could, the theory ultimately would be malleable and, therefore, vacuous. How-
ever, the theory's usefulness increases proportionately to the number of cases it can
explain.
202. See supra note 29. Benefit to the defendant-promisor is evident in sev-
eral cases. See, e.g., Esquire, 804 F.2d 87 (discussed supra notes 105- 12 and ac-
companying text); Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1986) (defend-
ant's promise induced plaintiffs to release claim for legal fees allowing defendant to
finalize property sale); In re Texas Mortgage Servs. Corp., 761 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.
1985) (promissor-defendant directly benefitted from transfer of trust funds by
plaintiff-mortgage broker); Gittes v. Cook Int'I, 598 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(plaintiff-businessman and financial consultant prevailed on promissory estoppel
claim when his detrimental reliance in resigning directorship benefitted the defend-
ant financially through stock sale); Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So.2d 770
(Ala. 1976) (defendant developers benefitted from promise inducing the plaintiff
homeowners to not oppose proposed annexation; plaintiffs prevailed on promissory
estoppel claim when defendant revoked promise); Hux v. Woodcock, 130 Ill. App.
3d 721, 474 N.E.2d 958 (1985) (plaintiff prevailed against former law partners who
benefitted from his payment of costs, relying on their promise to convey real estate);
Kirkpatrick v. Seneca Nat'l Bank, 213 Kan. 61, 515 P.2d 781 (1973) (plaintiff-
accountant audited defendant bank's books to bank's benefit in reliance on promise
to pay); Sanders v. Dantzler, 375 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1979) (defendant's promise to
buy plaintiffs service station benefitted defendant by inducing plaintiff to cancel
lease with oil company, which enabled defendant to secure it); Everett v. Brown,
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promisor is a broader concept than the traditional bargained-for con-
sideration. A promisor may benefit from particular promisee con-
duct,oa even though the conduct would not constitute bargained-for
consideration because the promisor did not signal explicitly his will-
ingness to be bound by that particular promisee conduct.
Professors Farber and Matheson regard Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille''" as illustrative of a contract yielding not insubstantial
benefits to the promisor that would nevertheless fail the bargain re-
quirement because the promisor did not bargain specifically for such
benefits. In Mettille, after the employee commenced work, the em-
ployer distributed to employees a handbook detailing its employment
policies. The handbook described procedural job security provisions.
Viewed from the traditional bargain theory perspective, no contract
regarding the job security provisions existed.206 The employer's job
security promises were not supported by consideration because the
employer explicitly did not seek "an identifiable exchange" from the
employee.v" Professors Farber and Matheson concede that to find
an explicitly bargained-for exchange would be to "distort the
facts.?"?" Nevertheless, they would enforce such employer promises,
in part, because of the promisor employer benefits from the stability
of the employee. work force and other such benefits.' ••
321 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1984) (real estate agent prevailed on promissory estoppel
claim when he relied on homeowner's implied promise to extend listing agreement;
broker's action directly benefitted homeowner by securing a buyer); Remilong v,
Crolla, 576 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1978) (plaintiff-purchaser relied on defendant-seller's
promise to remove mobile homes from adjoining property, enabling defendant to sell
at a higher price).
203, This Article centends that promisee conduct furnishing the promisor a
benefit evidences the promisor's intent to be bound, at least in a context in which
persuasive barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, explicit or formalized
contracting exist. If such benefit can be shown, and such consent inferred, no reason
justifies restricting actionable detrimental reliance to instances in which the prom-
isee has actually expended monies. Detrimental reliance would naturally extend to
situations in which, for example, the promisee missed possible opportunities, pro-
vided the promisor derived benefits. For a discussion of the erosion of the reliance
requirement. see Farber & Matheson. supra note 16, at 929-35.
204, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). This case is discussed in Farber &
Matheson, supra note 16, at 920-22.
205. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 920, This view was argued by the
employer in Meuille, 333 N.W.2d at 624.
206. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 920.
207. Id. at 921. If the job security provisions were censtrued as a modifica-
tion. consideration separate and apart from that given by the promisee for the origi-
nal offer of employment would be required to enforce the contract. As the subject of
a preexisting duty, an employee's job performance would not qualify as sufficient
censideration. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
BUI see RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 89 (1981).
208. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 921. Significantly, the Mettille
case was not decided under § 90 but under the unilateral centract doctrine. 333
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Notwithstanding the not insubstantial, though not explicitly
bargained-for, benefit factor, the explanatory theory that justifies in-
tervention in such cases remains unclear. The explanatory theory of-
fered by Professors Farber and Matheson for the case law is based
on the convergence of two factors: (I) "a relationship that is ex-
pected to be ongoing'P'" and (2) an economic motive for making the
promise. ". These scholars believe that if these factors are present,
the court should and will likely entertain a promissory estoppel
claim. They postulate that if these factors are present, "inferences of
reciprocity" exist, creating an exchange as real as an orthodox bar-
gained-for exchange.'" Although the employer in Mettille may not
have bargained explicitly for an "identifiable exchange,"'" he was
in fact seeking such benefits as a nonunion work force in return for
his job security promises. They argue that the elements of a bargain
were present, albeit not of the traditional kind. This nontraditional
bargain should be recognized and enforced in ongoing relation-
ships.'" In such relationships "economic benefit is likely to be
sought through informal understandings that reinforce the relation-
ship, rather than through discrete bargains."'" They propose adopt-
ing a rule that would enforce promises made "in furtherance of eco-
nomic activity."'"
The broad view of exchange adopted by Professors Farber and
Matheson would also recognize an exchange in Hoffman v. Red
Owl.'" In Hoffman, the plaintiff, a bakery store owner, sought to
acquire a grocery store franchise from the defendant. The defendant
initially assured the plaintiff that he could acquire a franchise by
investing $18,000 in the operation. During the course of negotiating
over two years, the defendant continued to add conditions, primarily
in the form of added capital requirements. Moreover, the defendant
advised the plaintiff to sell his bakery and to acquire a small grocery
store. The defendant's unspoken but implied signalv" was that the
plaintiff could secure the contract by following the defendant's ad-
N.W.2d at 627. The facts in Metti/le make a § 90 recovery appropriate.
209. Id. at 925.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 921, quoted in Goetz & Scoll, Enforcing Promises: An Examina-
tion of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1308 (1980).
212. Id. at 920.
213. Id. at 925.
214. Id. at 925-26.
215. Id. at 929.
216. 26 Wis. 2d 683,133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). This case has not been previ-
ously rationalized in terms of an exchange. Other commentators have rationalized
the result in Hoffman in terms of a liability rule based on "improper conduct in the
negotiation process." E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL. supra note 44, at 296-98.
217. For a discussion of implicit contracting, see supra note 28 and accompa-
nying text.
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vice. The defendant was arguably bargaining for certain actions in
exchange for his promise of a franchise despite the fact that he never
signalled explicitly and unequivocally that he would consider himself
bound should the plaintiff undertake the advised actions because he
did not use language such as "in exchange for." The plaintiffs ac-
tions economically benefitted the defendant in several ways. The de-
fendant was able to acquire more information about the plaintiffs
potential capability and about the market for a franchise. The de-
fendant thus was assured of having a qualified franchisee, which ob-
viated the need for training additional franchisees and reduced the
costs and risks associated with finding another qualified
franchisee.v"
This Article shares the view of Farber and Matheson that prom-
issory estoppel is a "contractual'P'" theory but rationalizes both
promissory estoppel and bargain theory in terms of an underlying
theory of assent-based obligation, rather than as an expanded view
of exchange. Both promissory estoppel and bargain are merely tools
for delineating the elemental criteria of contract law-the presence
of assent-based obligation.v" Under certain circumstances, only ex-
plicit bargaining or formalities will establish that the criteria for as-
218. Under reciprocal inducement theory, however, the fact that the promisor
may have benefited from and even desired the actions taken by the promisee was
insufficient to attach liability. If the promisor did not bargain explicitly for such
actions, no liability ensued. In Hoffman, the promisor did not bargain explicitly for
the promisee's reliance in acquiring grocery store experience. Therefore, the fran-
chisee's detrimental reliance would be considered not bargained for. This approach
explains Justice Hand's refusal in James Baird Co. v, Gimbel Bros., lnc., 64 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1933), to accept the view that the reliance of the promisee-contractor,
in using the bid from a subcontractor to obtain a construction contract, should
render the promise to offer the materials binding, despite the fact that the offeror
was clearly not indifferent to, and in fact desired, the actions of the promisee. As
Justice Hand explained:
[T]he defendant offered to deliver the linoleum in exchange for the plain-
tiffs acceptance, not for its bid, which was a mailer of indifference to it.
That offer could become a promise to deliver only when the equivalent was
received; that is, when the plaintiff promised to take and pay for it.
ld. at 346.
219. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 905; see also supra note 23.
220. "In sum, bargained-for consideration and nonbargained-for reliance are
equivalent to the extent that the existence of either in a transaction may manifest
the intentions of one or both of the parties to be legally bound," Barnell, supra note
5,at317,
This Article contributes to Barnett's theory by (I) developing an explanatory
theory to delineate the boundary between bargain and reliance, once both are ac-
cepted as "indicia of consent," id. at 313; (2) developing a conceptual mechanism
linking the presence of a plausible benefit to the promisor and evidence of assent to
be bound; (3) offering a theory to support adhering to the bargain theory in a small
residuum of transactions; and (4) responding to likely conceptual critiques of the
theory.
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sent have been met. In other cases, however, less explicit communi-
cation or explicit but informal communication can evidence assent.
The presence of a not insubstantial benefit to the promisor from
promisee conduct evidences assent to be bound on the part of the
promisor. The defendant promisor, for a variety of logical reasons,
may dispense with explicit and unequivocal signals of his willingness
to be bound. The promisor may instead use less explicit communica-
tion, secure in the expectation that those lesser signals will produce
the desired conduct. Thus, to infer a willingness to be bound on the
basis of promisee conduct that contributes a not insubstantial benefit
to the promisor is plausible.
Together, the plausible benefit to the promisor factor and the
existence of barriers to contracting factor offer a convincing explana-
tory basis for the case law. When barriers to explicitly reciprocal or
formalized contracting exist, the absence of traditional forms of or-
thodox contracting does not necessarily indicate a lack of assent.
Rather, in certain factual settings the parties are unlikely to mani-
fest assent in traditional forms. Thus, the proposed theory sensitizes
the reader to the possibility of assent being manifested in different
ways.
An assent-based liability theory that adopts an incremental ap-
proach to the signals required to show assentf" would engender at
least two different results than Farber and Matheson's theory. First,
an assent-based theory would promote broader enforcement of
promises made in a "donative" setting.··· Second, the theory would
provide a different rationale for refusing to enforce promises made in
the context of a highly lawyered, discrete commercial transaction.
Donative promises would be enforceable under the proposed ap-
proach provided that one could show persuasive reasons for the ab-
sence of formalities and a plausible benefit to the promisor. Donative
promises are often made in familial settings involving relations of
trust and confidence. Therefore, persuasive reasons exist for promis-
ees relying without a formalized contract or explicit promisor signals
that the reliance is being sought by the promisor in exchange for his
promise.
Farber and Matheson would not enforce donative promises be-
cause they are not made "in furtherance of economic activity."'"
221. See O. WILLIAMSON. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 28, at 223.
222. They would be classified as "donative" by Professors Farber and Mathe-
son because they would not be "in furtherance of an economic commitment." Far-
ber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 929, 937. However, under certain circumstances,
this Article suggests a limited enforcement of these promises.
223. Id. at 929. "Unlike promises made in an economic setting, these [dona-
tive] promises are not generally made to coordinate activities or generate reliance
beneficial to the promisor." Id. at 937 (footnote omitted).
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Their approach, however, views economic commitments too nar-
rowly. Their theory fails to recognize that even promises made in
donative settings can evidence an exchange or bargain. In some cir-
cumstances, we can infer that the promisor has indicated a willing-
ness to be bound because he believes he will be better off as a result
of certain conduct by the promisee. The Farber !Matheson theory
fails to explain cases enforcing donative promises inducing reliance
in familial or other settings of trust.v"
In Ricketts v. Scothorni" the court was presented with persua-
sive reasons for the absence of orthodox formalities and the presence
of the requisite, albeit implicit, signals of assent. In Ricketts, the
defendant-grandfather executed a promissory note promising to pay
the plaintiff-granddaughter $2,000 on demand. Under the bargain
theory of contract, this promise would be unenforceable because the
grandfather did not explicitly bargain for anything in exchange for
his promise. The grandfather gave no indication that he sought and
would consider himself bound by the detrimental conduct of his
granddaughter. Nevertheless, liability should be imposed on the de-
fendant-grandfather. Both parties probably operated on the basis of
informal understandings and trust, creating persuasive reasons for
the absence of explicit bargaining. Moreover, the granddaughter's
reliance provided a plausible benefit to the grandfather even if he
did not specifically bargain for such benefit. The promisee relied by
quitting her job. The grandfather's statement at the time of his
promise that "none of my other grandchildren work, and you don't
have to" reflected his interest in the promisee's reliance." In such
circumstances, the absence of explicitly bargained-for consideration
should not necessarily be equated with the absence of assent.
The proposed theory also differs from Farber and Matheson's in
its rationale for denying effect to promises made between equals in a
highly lawyered, discrete transaction." Professors Farber and
Matheson would agree that such promises should not be enforced
because they were not made in the context of an ongoing relation-
ship." The assent-based approach suggested by this Article would
deny enforcement because of the lack of manifested assent. In a
highly lawyered, discrete transaction, in which both parties are
aware of contract formalities and explicit reciprocal bargaining, one
could not infer that the parties failed to achieve orthodox contracts
224. For a discussion of court decisions enforcing donative promises, see
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: principle From Precedents, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639
(1952), and cases cited therein.
225. 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
226. [d. at 54. 77 N.W. at 366.
227. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16. at 925-26.
228. [d.
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because of natural barriers. In such a transaction, it is unlikely that
the parties would forego formalities because of trust in the other
party. Thus, one plausible explanation for dispensing with formalities
is that both parties implicitly agreed to bear the risk of the other
party's failure to perform. Making promissory estoppel available in
such cases inappropriately could compensate parties who likely had
chosen to have orthodox contract rules govern their conduct. To the
extent that such parties have relied without the benefit of a formal
contract, they relied without the expectation of contract enforceabil-
ity. Intervening in such cases would also upset the expectations of
the party who carefully and intentionally avoided reaching the mo-
ment of contract formation. For example, in a highly lawyered trans-
action, one can see why it might be appropriate to insist on orthodox
formalities. In R.G. Groupi": in which the parties were negotiating
a possible purchase, with the aid of lawyers in a one shot deal, the
parties did not suffer from certain barriers to orthodox contracting
such as lack of knowledge of the formalities or special problems of
low natural endowment. Arguably, however, they, nonetheless, faced
a barrier to explicit contracting. The need to expend resources to
collect information about a deal and the un foreseeability of the fu-
ture created informational barriers to the promisor. These barriers
hampered the promisor's ability to specify in a highly specified, fully
contingent, explicitly reciprocal manner the terms on which he would
be willing to be bound in the future. However, notwithstanding these
barriers, the absence of implicit contracting probably renders the ap-
plication of promissory estoppel inappropriate.v? The court's finding
of the parties' understanding that no agreement could exist until
they signed a written agreement would make it hard to find evidence
of the promisor's implicit contract signals that he is seeking some
initial steps from the promisee that would facilitate finalizing the
parties' subsequent relations and that were, therefore, valuable to the
promisor. On these facts, it is difficult to infer a willingness by the
promisor to keep the promisee informed of any change in willingness
to reach a more completely explicit bargain. The parties' under-
standing of the promise as conditioned on signing the written con-
tract precluded reasonably inferring implicit contracts of the kind
described above.
V. THE SUGGESTED ApPROACH AND ITs ADVANTAGES
In certain situations parties may fail to overcome certain natu-
ral barriers to explicit reciprocal bargaining. Alternatively, parties
having achieved an orthodox contract, replete with explicit and
229. See supra note 143.
230. See supra note 28.
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pointed evidence of reciprocal inducement signals, may fail to memo-
rialize the agreement in writing. This Article explains the numerous
barriers to achieving orthodox contracts and equates the presence of
a benefit to the promisor with a willingness to be bound. The Article
then suggests that there is no justification for myopically adhering to
orthodox rules as the exclusive legitimate indicators of assent. The
following section suggests a workable test to determine when an al-
ternative liability rule should be employed.
Plaintiffs attempting to prevail on promissory estoppel claims
should be permitted to offer evidence of persuasive natural barriers
to explicit signalling of reciprocal inducement or to formalizing the
contract. The plaintiff would point to disparate status, disparate
knowledge of the law or the transaction, or to a relationship of trust
or confidence, or to a complex relationship as evidence of such barri-
ers. Evidence of any of these three factors should give rise to a re-
buttable presumption that barriers to reciprocal inducement or other
formalities exist. To require the plaintiff to go further and to prove,
for example, that a status disparity created a natural barrier to or-
thodox contracting ignores the fact that, often, the best evidence of
the inhibiting effect of disparate status is simply the absence of an
orthodox bargain.
The defendant can rebut the presumption by presenting evi-
dence to negate the inhibiting effect of disparate status on explicit
bargaining or formalized contracting. Suppose, that a plaintiff had
presented evidence of a status disparity, contending that his inferior
status indicated that he had less sophisticated knowledge of the ap-
plicable law than the defendant. The defendant should be able to
introduce evidence disputing the connection between the disparate
status and the lack of an explicit bargain or contract formalities. The
defendant might, for example, offer evidence that he had thoroughly
explained to the plaintiff, in a manner understandable to the plain-
tiff, that any reliance expenditures taken by the plaintiff would not
be for the defendant and would be at the plaintiffs risk. The plain-
tiff could no longer plead ignorance to explain the absence of an
explicit bargain or contract formalities. Similarly, a defendant can
negate the existence of trust in an ongoing relationship by demon-
strating that all matters were handled formally through legal memo-
randa. In such cases, orthodox contract doctrine should be applied
because the absence of formalities is not explainable in terms of nat-
ural barriers to explicit or formalized bargaining. The absence may
only connote the parties' desire that ordinary contract rules govern
their preliminary negotiations.
Once the plaintiff persuades the court that significant barriers
to, or reasons for dispensing with, orthodox formalities exist, the
plaintiff must then establish a plausible benefit to the promisor to
prove assent to liability.
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Significant benefits would result from the consideration of the
factors identified in this Article in determining contractual liability.
A theory that focuses on the nature and components of exchange
and alternate evidence of its occurrence would provide a unified the-
ory of the case law in terms of assent-based obligation and reconcile
variable results among what has been described as a "motley group"
of cases .... By sensitizing courts to the complexities of the dynamics
of assent, the theory would liberate contract law from the gate-
keeper's narrow-minded mentality that restricts the entrance to as-
sent-based obligation to those who have used certain prescribed indi-
cia and relegates others to the world of nonassent based obligation.
By allowing courts to recognize assent in whatever form they
find it and permitting them to attribute assent-verifying relevance to
the factors identified above, courts' theories of enforceability would
be premised on a model of human behavior tailored to the percep-
tions of how "real, as opposed to hypothetical legal actors"'" re-
spond to the threat of judicial nonenforcementv" of promises not
pointedly explicit as to well specified consideration or not sufficiently
formal. Thus sensitized to the dynamics of assent between real-world
actors, courts could intelligently determine which rule of legal liabil-
ity-promissory estoppel or orthodox contract law-would best pro-
mote optimal behavior and would best recognize economic exchanges
on about the terms the parties indicate by their behavior they are
tending towards, but about which they are unable, or deem it unnec-
essary, to be orthodoxically explicit.v"
In addition to sensitizing the courts to the fact that assent can
be manifested in a variety of ways, the approach suggests the impor-
tance of the benefit factor useful in identifying assent, at least when
it occurs in circumstances with persuasive barriers to, or explana-
tions for dispensing with, orthodox contracting. If the promisor de-
rives a plausible benefit, even if not of a discrete, tangible economic
nature, perhaps an implied element of a bargaining process exists
that warrants promise enforcement. Thus, if it is clear to a reasona-
231. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 16, at 474. The incoherence in the case
law is "one of the few points of agreement between the critical legal scholars on the
left and the law and economics writers on the right." Farber & Matheson, supra
note 16, at 903.
232. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1699.
233. [d.
234. Thus, an assent-based liability rule would be premised upon the same
foundations as the orthodox explicitness standards. It would, however, recognize
that fairly strong signals of better-offness from exchange can be found without such
explicitness. An assent-based liability rule would supply the same incentives and
disincentives for exchange as orthodox rules but would recognize that some parties
are deterred from achieving orthodox contracts by palpably inhibiting
circumstances.
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ble person that the promisor has substantial interest in the actions
taken, even if they do not constitute a tangible benefit, and it is also
evident that barriers to explicitly reciprocal exchange exist, perhaps
an orthodox bargain is not necessary. To insist on such evidence of a
bargain, in a context in which such will not occur because of barriers
to more explicit contracting, is to make an a priori decision to with-
hold enforcement and to overlook real, but implied, signals of a bar-
gain. In such contexts, it is incumbent upon the person in whom
trust has been reposed and who wishes to be exempt from liability to
clarify that the promisee will act at his peril and that the promisee's
actions will not be regarded as a benefit to the promisor.
The suggested approach would also allow courts, guided by the
goal of maximizing exchange, to determine when to apply traditional
contract rules and alternatively, when to apply an alternate liability
rule. Furthermore, the proposed theory of assent-based liability
would also help to explain the need for limits on the availability of
promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel should not be utilized in
circumstances such as the highly lawyered, discrete transaction'" in
which no barriers to explicit and formalized bargaining occur, but
should be available in the intrafamily setting. A theory of assent-
based liability would also allay scholarly fears that the continued
growth of the promissory estoppel doctrine could destroy contract
law altogether.f" It would help "clos[e] the relational gap"'S7 in
modern contract law by devising a system that sensitively considers
how agreement may manifest itself in an enmeshed, as opposed to a
"discrete," relationship,
VI. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED THEORY AND
ApPROACH
Some critics will attack the suggested approach on the same
grounds that the realists attacked the formalists, arguing that,
nothwithstanding the approach's "claims to predictability. , . [and]
coherence.t'v" its virtues are overstated - it cannot work. Others
will attack the approach as leading to bad results, or on political
grounds "for its ideological bias in its continuing to privilege the 'in-
dividualist' over the 'communitarian' role."?" Others will argue that
235. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text,
236. See, e.g., Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 685 ("reliance
principle has the potential to overwhelm the expectation principle"). Observers
feared the reliance principle primarily because they perceived it to be nonassent-
based. Promissory estoppel will not be perceived as so alien to contract law once this
assent-based nature is recognized.
237. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 925.
238. Gordon, Tentative Outline. supra note 41, at 20.
239. ld. The centrality of autonomy and exchange principles in the proposed
1987] ASSENT-BASED LIABILITY 953
in re-elevating the importance of assent, this Article has suppressed
the important "public aspect of contract'P'" doctrine, and in doing so
has joined the ranks of those who have censored out or relegated
"public aspectjs}'>" of contract doctrine to unimportant corners of
contract law in order to "portray contract as essentially private and
free."242 Still others will argue that the approach fails to overcome
that internal contradiction of contract law that makes a "unified ra-
tional system" impossible!"
A. The Classification Problem
The first criticism is that the required fact classifications would
render the approach too difficult to implement. Since "no single
characterization of facts is relevant or irrelevant"? .. and since there
are "no constraints on the categorization of the facts of any particu-
lar case,'?" devising a test based on such classification would invite
doctrinal incoherence and uncertainty. Critics might claim that
courts cannot simply "identify" when the factors identified as barri-
ers to explicit signalling of reciprocal inducement or written formali-
ties are present or when a plausible benefit exists. Both parties will
view ambiguous facts differently. One party will argue that ordinary,
orthodox, contract law should govern. Conversely, the other party
will urge the court to apply promissory estoppel law claiming, for
example, that a relationship of trust existed between the parties.
Thus, determining whether one of the outlined factors is present will
be extremely difficult and "subject to considerable manipulation.vv"
The classification criticism can be answered as follows. Courts
regularly make difficult factual determinations to decide questions of
good faith'"? or reasonableness. Thus, the courts' burden is consis-
theory, concededly, may render it vulnerable to this political criticism.
240. Dalton, supra note 2, at 1010.
241. Id. at 1010-11.
242. Id. at 1010.
243. Gordon, Tentative Outline, supra note 41. at 20.
244. Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 704.
245. Id.
246. Id. Professor Kennedy explains, "the process [of classification] is not
self-executing: people are certain to disagree strongly about how to classify, accord-
ing to their purposes in making the distinction in the first place." Kennedy, Private
Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1732.
Difficulties in classifying facts increase the likelihood that courts will describe
the facts to suit their purposes, For the dangers of this process and the need for fact
skepticism, see supra note 52.
247, For an example of the difficulties inherent in determining the good faith
of a party's exercise of discretion to buy or sell in the context of an output or re-
quirements context, see Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV, L REV. 369 (1980); see also Muris, Opportunis-
tic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L REV. 521 (1981); Summers,
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tent with that imposed on all modern courts that often apply more
open-ended standards. Moreover, any difficulty of classification in-
herent in implementing the proposed theory merits the effort. Courts
will encourage parties to develop evidence on whether natural and
persuasive barriers to explicit reciprocal inducement or formalized
contracting exist. This process will foster recognition of the nature
and components of exchange, as well as alternate evidence of its
occurrence.
B. Categorizing Facts: An Invitation to Judicial Policymaking?
Critics may claim that the suggested approach will invite courts
to implement hidden policy agendas because it "cannot provide even
the semblance of an objective basis for judicial decision."••• Further,
critics may argue that if courts are invited to implement their poli-
cies, no neutral, objective means of deciding which policies to imple-
ment exists and that the facts alone are an insufficient guide for
"choosing among competing values."••• To answer the above criti-
cism, one first must look to legal history. Such history indicates that
this criticism rests on a much scorned premise: that it is possible or
even desirable to construct a perfectly abstract system that can be
administered without any intrusion by the much-hated, much-feared
policy judgment. The legal realists had the proper response to the
critic who would condemn the proposed approach for opening a Pan-
dora's box of policy-policy making is inevitable. Even the Willis-
tonian formalists who pretended to be hermetically protected from
policy judgments "regularly manipulated [their rules1 to reach one
result or the other in situations that could be distinguished only by
close attention to social or economic context ..... u
Given the universality of policy making, the response to criti-
cism that the approach suggested here will foster policymaking is "so
what?" Such judgments are inevitable and the proposed approach is
no worse than any other in that regard. An alternative response sug-
gests that the proposed approach will be less likely to foster implicit
unarticulated policy judgments than classical formalism. Since the
proposed approach considers individual circumstances, including var-
iations in human behavior, factors that the classicists studiously ig-
nored or denied, interpreting the facts to avoid underlying inequities
may be unnecessary. These "inequities" most likely result from in-
sisting upon static unified rules of enforceability even when the as-
sumptions about human behavior underlying the rules have been de-
supra note 23.
248, Feinman, Judicial Method, supra note 8, at 704.
249. /d. at 708.
250, Gordon, supra note I, at 1025-26.
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bunked. For example, when contract law assumed that all parties
could read and protect themselves by contract'" and denied excuses
to parties who signed contracts they did not understand, courts often
manipulated the facts to find duress or fraud to excuse the promisor
and avoid unjust results." .. The pressure to manipulate the facts di-
minished when the courts recognized the realities of bargaining
power and devised doctrinal excuses premised on more realistic as-
sumptions about human behavior.
C. The Proposed Approach Lacks "Quality of 'Ruleness' .....
and Will Discourage Investment and Exchange
Scholars might also attack the suggested approach by claiming
that it lacks "the quality of 'ruleness' " ••• and "formal real-
izability"'" characteristic of nineteenth century classical rules .•••
Since the approach requires courts to make complex factual classifi-
cations, the courts cannot merely "respond to the presence together
of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situa-
tion by intervening in a determinate way."'" This uncertainty ar-
guably will hamper predictable judicial decisionmaking and more se-
verely, discourage transactions. Parties would hesitate to transact,
not knowing whether their transactions would be enforced.··· Parties
invest only if they can rely on judicial sanctions for nonperformance
by other parties. Only formalized abstract rules can achieve this
certainty.
The above criticisms are the familiar ones leveled against all
informal legal approaches. Underlying them is a belief that if judges
adhere to formalized rules, the parties will learn the rules and "ad-
just their activities in advance to take account of them."".
251. EA FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 4.14, at 248.
252. These were the limited "constitutive exceptions" to the general rule en-
forcing private agreements. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra
note 8, at 569, 577.




257. /d. at 1687-88.
258. Id. at 1698.
259. Id. at 1688. A natural corollary to this helief in the ability of rules to
encourage transactions is a belief that vaguer standards such as good faith, reasona-
bleness and unconscionability will discourage investment in two ways.
The uncertainty of the outcome if the judge is at large in finding intent,
rather than bound to respond mechanically to ritual acts like sealing, will
reduce the payoff that can be expected from being careful. Second, the
dangers of imprecision are reduced because the judge may bail you out if
you blunder.
Id. at 1698.
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In response, the assumption that investment depends on formal-
ized, orthodox, nineteenth century type contract principles hinges on
certain behavioral assumptions about how idealized economic actors
will react to nonformal standards.f" Concededly, some parties will
hesitate to transact without knowing the rules and without confi-
dence that the judiciary will strictly enforce the rules. In the highly
lawyered, discrete transaction in which there is no likelihood of trust,
parties simply will only rely on an explicit reciprocal bargain or a
formalized written contract.
To conclude, on the basis of an incomplete model of human be-
havior, that one system-the orthodox one-that facilitates transact-
ing in certain contexts will promote dealing in all contexts is not a
necessary inference. Moreover, such an inference evinces a closed
door policy. It assumes that because the orthodox formalistic rules
were perceived to facilitate exchange and trust in a credit economy,
it follows that a competing, nonformal, fact-oriented approach will
hinder those goals. Recognizing that the formalistic orthodoxy was
formulated on a distinct model of human behavior suggests that
changes in assumptions about, and recognition of, variations in
human behavior will render the orthodox model obsolete in contexts
in which the model is inaccurate. Such changed assumptions may
justify applying a different approach to enforcement that is tailored
to a more accurate model of human behavior.
Moreover, the certainty characteristic of the formal system was
mythological'" and extant only in the classicist imagination. Thus,
the alleged necessity of formal investment rules is a problematic as-
sumption. All systems presumably suffer from some uncertainty.
Thus neither a system of formal rules or one of vague standards nec-
essarily will better promote investment.
Having determined that informal systems may be appropriate
and workable, the question remains why an approach enforcing
promises in the identified circumstances actually will promote trans-
actions between parties. In response, when one of the identified fac-
tors, such as a disparity in knowledge or a complex relation, is pre-
sent, parties will rely on informal and implicit understandings
without the benefit of a formal structure. In such situations, denying
effectiveness to promises that were not orthodoxically enforceable
actually would discourage transactions. Parties who would have re-
lied without explicit, pointed signals of reciprocal inducement or
without written contracts will now "invest in precautions to insure
themselves against the increased risk of betrayal. ..... Transactions
will be discouraged as a result of their increased costs. A legal sys-
260. See Speidel, supra note 162.
261. Gordon, supra note I, at 1025-26.
262. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 928.
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tern that reduces their costs of achieving transactional benefits, rec-
ognizes that parties sometimes will rely on informal understandings,
and effectuates those understandings is a better one. Given the diffi-
culty of achieving a legal system that can operate mechanically, the
proposed approach will maximize the courts' ability to effectuate
certain policies, such as encouraging transactions at the least cost.
D. Overenforcement of Promises
Another potential criticism of the proposed approach is that al-
most all transactions can be put into one category or the other once
all factors are considered. Thus, promissory estoppel would be poten-
tially available in most cases, provided the requisite benefit to the
promisor could be shown. Only a few residual transactions would
warrant applying orthodox rules. The assertion that the suggested
approach would circumscribe the reach of orthodox contract law is a
valid criticism, however, only if such a result is deemed incorrect.
Yet, if, however, the liability rule advocated in this Article provides
the same incentives for parties to deal with one another as the ortho-
dox rules, then the advocated rule will enhance the exchange and
will not result in the over-enforcement of promises.
E. "Political Critique'''·'
Despite this Article's flexibility in developing legal approaches
that consider the multiplicity of human behavior, its approach may
be criticized as flawed. It may be said to reflect an "ideological bias
in its continuing to privilege the 'individualist' over the 'communi tar-
ian' pole; of the purposes of 'efficiency' over distributive fairness or
paternalist sympathy."'·' The approach purportedly may reflect an
individualistic bias by legitimizing a liability rule by reference to the
wills of the parties. It fails to explore the possibility of formulating a
liability rule based on criteria other than those designed to ascertain
the individual wills of the parties. It excludes, for example, con-
structing a system of contracts based on distributive justice or shar-
ing of losses.··· Admittedly, the Article's weakness is in postulating
assent as one of a "few core principles'P'" of the system. It has ar-
guably embraced as policy objectives the ascertainment of assent and
the facilitation of exchanges between parties. These objectives are
not internally justifiable as indisputable first principles. In short, no
easy way exists to convince the reader why these policy objectives
should prevail over other objectives as the basis for contract law.
263. Gordon, Tentative Outline, supra note 41, at 20.
264. Id.
265. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication. supra note 8, at 1717.
266. Gordon, supra note I, at 1026.
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This ideological critique evokes two responses. First, we can no
longer believe in first principles or "suprahistorical norms" and ac-
cept the "historical contingency" of all policy objectives.r" Never-
theless, the Article should not be vulnerable to the attack of ideologi-
cal bias for merely identifying the policy objectives that seem to
explain the legal decisions.
Characterizing the approach as individualistically and ideologi-
cally biased is misguided for another reason. Assuming the need for
enforcing promises as nonideologically biased is accepted, the ap-
proach advocated considers individualism and "comrnunitarian" vi-
sions, as different models of human behavior rather than as polar
opposite biases. Parties who act to maximize their self-interest will
manifest their assent to exchange in certain ways. In other situa-
tions, when considering the "relational norms of solidarity, reciproc-
ity, and flexibility,"'·' those same parties will manifest exchange dif-
ferently and perhaps less explicitly. Thus, the system is not biased
ideologically but accommodates the differential settings in which
parties contract.
F. Fundamental Contradiction in Modern Contract Theory
Critical legal studies'·' scholars will criticize the suggested ap-
proach for failing to overcome the contradiction between "irreconcil-
able visions of humanity and society, and between radically different
aspirations for our common future"?" namely between altruism and
individualism.?" Efforts to reconcile these visions have failed.
Professor Kennedy contends that each of these conflicting vi-
sions272 are reflected in "opposed modes for dealing with questions of
the form in which legal solutions"?" should be formulated. Individu-
alism is compatible with strictly applied rules while altruism encour-
ages resort to standards ....
The substantive visions differ in several ways. Individualism em-
phasizes self-reliance,'" reflecting a belief that individuals have no
obligation to "share or sacrifice" benefits derived from their ef-
267. u. at 1025, 1017.
268. Gordon, Tentative Outline, supra note 41, at 21.
269. For an overview of critical legal studies theory, see Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983); Note, Round and Round
the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Crirical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1982).
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forts.!" Altruism, in contrast, advocates "sharing and sacrifice. "'77
These premises or "images'P'" of society are reflected in differ-
ing views of "the proper definition of liability'?" and in contradic-
tory views of an appropriate substantive liability rule. The premises
also differed in the role envisioned for the courts. Individualists were
ambivalent about the courts' role. They advocated a realm free of
judicial interference in which individuals could act without "respon-
sibility. . . for the effects [of their acts] on others;"'·· yet, recogniz-
ing the need for "[sjome level of protection of person and prop-
erty,"?" the individualists carved out a limited role for the judiciary
to enforce voluntary agreements. The individualists were committed
to a system of formalized abstract rules that could be administered
mechanically and without unwarranted judicial interference.
Altruists embraced different and competing social values.'.'
They attacked the principles supporting the individualists' structure.
They delegitimized classical individualism by exposing the "social
contingency of decisions and policy choices'P'" of the formalists.
Claiming both "presumptive legitimacy"'" and neutrality for the
classical system became impossible as did thinking of judicial deci-
sions as anything other than imposing competing judicial agendas.
Consequently, altruism and individualism began to enjoy a "parity in
argumentative positions."?" Although both visions have supporters,
both have failed to "generate a new set of principles or
meta principles to replace late lamented concepts."?"
This Article contends that an assent-based liability theory can
reconcile these conflicting portraits.v" Individualist and collectivist
notions reflect incompletev" accounts of how individuals conduct
themselves on a real versus idealized basis. Some individuals are self-
reliant, able to maximize their welfare, and able to explicitly signal
the terms on which they will consider themselves better off. For
these individuals, the classical rules grounded on self-reliance and
self-protection are sensible and should be applied. For other individ-
uals, the vision of a world of determined self-reliant, profit maximiz-
276. [d.
277. [d. at 1717.
278. Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 830.
279. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1728.
280. /d. at 1713.
281. u. at 1715.
282. [d. at 1717-22.
283. Gordon, supra note 1, at 1026.
284. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication. supra note 8, at 1733.
285. /d.
286. /d.
287. Feinman. Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 830.
288. u. at 843.
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ing individuals is incomplete. This vision neglects the varied and rich
complexity of human existence in which some individuals are linked
by " 'relational' norms of solidarity.v''" In such cases, applying rules
premised on a potentially inaccurate view of the world in which no
barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, orthodox formalities
exist is not sensible. Instead, different rules that take account of this
behavioral complexity should be applied.
The approach suggested in this Article applies such rules, postu-
lating that when there are no persuasive barriers to explicitly recip-
rocal contracting because both parties are truly self-reliant and inde-
pendent individuals, the courts apply rules premised on accurate
assumptions of the lack of such barriers. When parties are linked
together in a complex manner that creates barriers to explicitly re-
ciprocal contracting, the courts properly apply promissory estoppel
premised on a different, yet contextually accurate view, of human
behavior.
Thus, courts have become sensitized to individualized human
behavior in which some parties are self-reliant and others are depen-
dent. In imposing liability in the promissory estoppel context, how-
ever, courts still uphold the basic individualist value that liability
should depend on manifested assent. Courts, however, are more sen-
sitive to the manner of manifesting such assent because of changing
perceptions about social relations.
The proposed approach reconciles altruism and individualism,
suggesting that these should be considered as different models of
human behavior rather than as competing "aspirations. "'.0 This de-
bate is understandable if one realizes that the formal model ignored
the complexity of human behavior and insisted on a model of human
behavior in which all men were able to explicitly signal the terms on
which they would be bound. At that level, the image of self-reliance
reflects a value choice rather than a model of human behavior.
The collectivists reacting against the individualist model argued
that "courts. . . examine the process of agreement, the terms of the
contract, and its social and economic context to ensure that enforce-
ment accords with social values.'?" The collectivists openly advo-
cated referring to social values in interpreting and enforcing con-
tracts. The collectivists' greatest impetus to doing so, however, was
the persistence of a model of human behavior that was still built on
a notion of equally free individuals.··· The persistence of that indi-
vidualist pattern and the inappropriateness of classical rules pre-
mised on that model for new situations prompted collectivists to re-
289. Gordon, Tentative Outline, supra note 41, at 21.
290. Kennedy, Private Law Adjudication, supra note 8, at 1685.
291. Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 8, at 842-43.
292. Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory, supra note 16, at 502.
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sort to social values to avoid the unfair and unacceptable results that
followed from applying orthodox rules to situations not involving two
self-reliant parties.
If, however, the complexity of human behavior is built into the
rules, resorting to social values to curb the abuses of applying a uni-
fied model to nonunified situations may be unnecessary. Thus, in sit-
uations in which natural inhibitions to orthodox arrangements are
not present, applying orthodox rules is sensible. In situations contain-
ing such barriers, promissory estoppel is appropriate. The system re-
mains vulnerable to attack for its premise on the individualistic value
of ascertaining assent and promoting exchange. However, the com-
peting altruistic and distributive motives need not be invoked when
the system accurately accounts for human complexity in
relationships.
VII. THE PROPOSED ApPROACH ApPLIED TO WRONGLY DECIDED
AND REASONED CASES
The benefits of the suggested approach are apparent when it is
applied to two cases in which the court failed to adequately consider
the relationship between the parties and the natural barriers to for-
malized contracting. Had the courts considered these factors, the re-
sults in the cases would have been more sensible.
In Grams v. Melrose-Mindoro Joint School District No.1'·' the
plaintiff had been a teacher in the school system for eight years
when the defendant school board fired her for lack of proper creden-
tials. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, relying in part on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.v" The court rejected the plaintiffs
claim, finding her reliance to be unreasonable.s'"
During the plaintiffs eight years as a teacher, the school board
knowingly appointed her to teach various subjects in which she was
not properly certified. Concurrently, the board gave her conflicting
advice on the necessity of acquiring appropriate certification. In
1965, the superintendent notified the plaintiff of the need for further
business machine training.··· In 1969, the board questioned the
plaintiff about her lack of certification in the courses she was teach- .
ing. In 1971, the board alerted all teachers to keep their certifica-
tions current. 2.7 The superintendent also warned the plaintiff about
the difficulty of being recertified without commercial subject prepa-
ration. During the same eight year period the superintendent contra-
293. 78 Wis. 2d 569, 254 N.W.2d 730 (1977).
294. td at 578, 254 N.W.2d at 735.
295. Id. at 579, 254 N.W.2d at 735.
296. [d. at 573, 254 N.W.2d at 732.
297. [d. at 574, 254 N.W.2d at 733.
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dieted the board's warnings. In the summer of 1965, he expressed his
satisfaction that the plaintiff was teaching commercial subjects, not-
withstanding her noncertification because it relieved him of finding a
replacement.v" In 1969, after the board questioned the plaintiffs
noncertification in commercial courses, the superintendent told the
plaintiff that "[the certification problem] was not her responsibility
. . .. " ••• After the board had warned all teachers to keep their cer-
tifications current, the superintendent advised the plaintiff "not to
worry, he would take care of it."8 eo
After considering the plaintiffs breach of contract claim, the
court found that the July, I964, warning to the plaintiff of the certi-
fication requirement "precluded a reasonable expectation ... that
she could continue to teach in areas in which she was not quali-
fied."8.1 Thus her reliance on the superintendent's assurances was
unreasonable.v"
Under the proposed analysis, the court would first consider the
relationship between the parties. The eight year employment rela-
tionship would suggest that disparities in status and an enmeshment
in broader ties existed. This situation would create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that barriers existed to explicit reciprocal or to formalized
contracting. Given the disparity and enmeshment, the court should
have been more receptive to a promissory estoppel claim. The plain-
tiff was unlikely to insist that the superintendent's assurances be
translated into an orthodox contract either because she did not real-
ize the necessity for such formality to render the promise enforcea-
ble, or because she hesitated to jeopardize the ongoing relationship
by insisting on technicalities.
The Grams case also evidences a plausible benefit to the prom-
isor because the plaintiffs teaching of commercial courses relieved
the board of finding other qualified teachers. The benefit to the
board was reflected by the superintendent's statement that "he had
headaches enough . . . without having to look for a commercial
teacher . . . ."8.8
The presence of such a benefit to the promisor provides credible
evidence that the defendant bargained for the noncertified teacher to
continue teaching because it would relieve him of incurring expenses
in finding a substitute. The plaintiff was induced to continue teach-
ing by the defendant's promise that she had no cause to worry. Evi-
dence of a bargain existed even if such intangible benefits to the
298. [d. at 573, 254 N.W.2d at 732.
299. [d. at 573, 254 N.W.2d at 733.
300. [d. at 574, 254 N.W.2d at 733.
301. /d. at 579,254 N.W.2d at 735.
302. /d.
303. [d. at 573, 254 N.W.2d at 732: see also supra note 28.
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promisor as reduced turnover would not be classified as considera-
tion because no "identifiable exchange from the employee was
specified. "so.
Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co.,sos is also an appropriate case
for the analysis suggested in this Article. Lige involved a thirty-seven
year business relationship, during which the defendant supplied the
plaintiff with certain oil based materials. During the nine year pe-
riod preceding the lawsuit, the plaintiff purchased all of its asphalt
requirements from the defendant. In 1971, after other suppliers had
increased their prices, the plaintiff sought and obtained an oral guar-
antee306 that the defendant would not raise its prices, at least for
contracts on which the plaintiff had relied in making its own bids.
When the defendant announced his intention to raise prices, notwith-
standing his prior guarantee, the plaintiff sued on the oral guarantee.
The plaintiff alleged that the company had relied on the defend-
ant's oral promise by making bids and entering contracts that they
would not have done otherwise. The defendant contended that the
statute of frauds rendered the oral agreement unenforceable.w" The
plaintiff argued that the court should adopt section 217A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts.v" That section would have made
the oral promise enforceable on the basis of detrimental reliance, de-
spite the statute of frauds. Although the court recognized that the
principle of reliance could be used as a basis for enforcing promises
304. Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 920.
305. 96 Wash. 2d 291. 635 P.2d 103 (198\).
306. [d. at 293, 635 P.2d at 103.
307. [d. at 294, 635 P.2d at 104.
308. [d. at 295, 635 P.2d at 105. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§
139 (1981) states:
Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance
(1) A promise which promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice
requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise) the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly can-
cellation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance
in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms
are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by
the promisor.
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that would otherwise fall within the statute of frauds, it refused to
adopt section 2 I7A.'·9
Because the parties were involved in a significant financial
transaction and the plaintiff was a general contractor, they may have
been assumed to be on equal footing, making the case inappropriate
for promissory estoppel recovery. The court, however, failed to con-
sider the long-term relationship between the parties. Because of that
enmeshment, the parties were likely to trust each other without per-
ceiving the need to formalize their contract in writing. For that rea-
son, promissory estoppel should have been available if the requisite
benefit could have been shown.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified certain factors useful in identifying
when promissory estoppel claims will succeed or fail. The identifica-
tion of these circumstances helps to demonstrate that both promis-
sory estoppel and the bargain theory share unifying elemental crite-
ria that place them both within an assent-based theory of
enforceability; both are mere doctrinal methods for evidencing a con-
sensual exchange. It postulates that under certain conditions, only
explicit reciprocal bargaining or formalized contracting satisfies the
elemental criteria for establishing assent. Under other conditions,
when persuasive barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, ex-
plicit reciprocal or formalized contracts exist and a plausible benefit
to the promisor can be identified, only promissory estoppel is neces-
sary to evidence the presence of assent. This Article identifies the
factors useful in determining whether persuasive barriers to, or ex-
planations for dispensing with, formalized bargaining exist. By sug-
gesting that different circumstances call for the application of differ-
ent "rules" to take account of how real people are likely to take
account of and adjust to certain rules, the Article has suggested a
regime of contract under which the legal decision maker takes into
account assumptions about how real-world actors are likely to re-
spond to bargain or promissory estoppel rules. The Article has re-
sponded to potential theoretical criticisms and in doing so has sug-
gested that the theory has helped to bridge the fundamental
contradiction between the image of contract as torn between (1) the
autonomy principle and (2) a regime of social regulation.
309. 96 Wash. 2d at 300. 635 P.2d at 107.
